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This special issue addresses several matters related to self-incrimination.Joshua Tepfer, Laura Nirider, and Steven Drizin begin the issue in an arti-cle examining custodial interrogations of and confessions by juveniles.
The article reviews the law and social science evidence, and it offers guidance for
judges in juvenile confession cases. 
Bruce Frumkin addresses the same issue of confessing to a crime the defen-
dant, whether juvenile or adult, possibly did not commit. His focus is expert tes-
timony proffered to shed light on the voluntariness and validity of the confes-
sion. 
Kirk Heilbrun, Sanjay Shah, Elizabeth Foster,
Michael Keesler, and Stephanie Brooks look at a
different intersection of experts and defendants,
in the context of juvenile transfer cases. They
examine the law and social science related to
assessments of the juvenile’s empathy for the vic-
tim, acceptance of responsibility for the alleged
offense, and the issue of compelled disclosure by
the juvenile or a restricted assessment by the
expert. 
Thomas Grisso uses a developmental lens to
frame his commentary on the three, primary articles and provides insights for
law and policy. 
All four articles are exemplary in their weaving together law and social science
to inform legal policy and practice. These articles, taken together, point to some
of the challenges facing judges as they try to make just decisions in complex cir-
cumstances, and they also provide guidance for judges. 
I am grateful to these authors for their contributions, and I also want to
acknowledge the extensive editorial assistance I received on this issue from
Andrea Avila, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Law/Psychology Program, and Jus-
tine Greve, Kansas Court of Appeals.—Alan Tomkins
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Being AJA president has put me in a sort of catbird seatattending a number of events that provide the opportu-nity to interact with thoughtful judges and court leaders
and to gain perspective on the importance and value of AJA’s
mission of Making Better Judges.  
I was appointed to the Massachusetts District Court in 1986
at a time when then-Chief Justice Samuel E. Zoll and the court’s
administrative director, Jerome S. Berg (an early graduate of
what became the National Center for State Courts’ Institute of
Court Management), were moving forward with an
ambitious strategy to transform the district courts
from perceived places of rough justice to a more
credibly fair and impartial institution where there
is the sort of due process everyone can believe in.
Zoll and Berg were convinced of the transformative
nature of professional development and estab-
lished a judicial education committee, which I
chaired from 1992 to 2007.
I was fortunate enough to be introduced to
Patricia Murrell1 in time to learn some important
lessons about the relationship of leadership and
judicial education.  Pat’s most enduring legacy is that she pro-
vided a generation of judicial education leaders with valuable
tools we could use, and teach others to use, to make better
judges and transform our courts. 
Judicial educators and organizations like AJA become power-
ful transforming agents because we hold true and are firm in the
belief that judges are knowledgeable, skillful, ethical, caring, and
honorable professionals and that engagement in new learning is
motivating, forward thinking, energizing, and brings value to the
judiciary. That is why AJA is critical to the success of judges and
how it happens that AJA directly benefits the peace, tranquility,
and prosperity of our civil society.  This is AJA’s story and we
need to tell it in way that is clear and convincing. 
It was more than serendipity when I attended a judicial
excellence dinner in Massachusetts where my colleague Judith
Fabricant was honored and said:
“We tend to think of excellence as the quality of a sin-
gle judge—something each of us tries to achieve as we
sit alone in our courtrooms, or writing in our lobbies.
All of that is true.
“But I think judicial excellence is also a communal
endeavor—something we strive for together, and
something we achieve, if we do, together.   I would sug-
gest that judicial excellence depends on our joint
efforts—we cannot achieve it individually.
If our court system as a whole provides
quality justice to the public, then we all
succeed in serving our mission, and we all
can be justifiably proud.  If not, if we have
pockets of excellence but a pattern of
inconsistency, then the public does not
receive what it expects and is due, and that
reflects on all of us. 
“We achieve excellence together, I sug-
gest, by sharing with each other: by sharing
whatever expertise we have developed; by
giving our time to offer educational programs; by men-
toring new colleagues; by consulting with each other on
difficult problems; by offering support when any of us is
under attack, and by working together to improve the
administration of our court.”
Now then, if leadership is the capacity to discern and
develop resources, human or material, and if leadership
involves organizing and ordering those resources to resolve a
problem, realize a vision, or achieve a goal, leadership has to
start with who we are and then move to what we do. And since
education is the most powerful tool in the leader’s tool box, and
since AJA offers a wide variety of education opportunities and
publications, Prof. Murrell, Judge Fabricant, and AJA are excel-
lent leaders.  Right! Of course right. 
President’s Column
THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEADERSHIP, JUDICIAL 
EDUCATION, AND JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE
Elliott Zide
1. Dr. Patricia Murrell recently retired from the faculty at the Uni-
versity of Memphis, where in 1988 she helped found the Leader-
ship Institute in Judicial Education and the Institute for Faculty
Excellence in Judicial Education.  She has made a tremendous
difference in the field of judicial-branch education and in the
lives of countless judges, judicial educators, and colleagues.
Many of us who were influenced greatly by attending Pat’s lead-
ership programs were asked to write tributes on the occasion of
Pat’s retirement.  Some of the thoughts in this message come from
that tribute. 
This article, tailored for a judicial audience, is taken from one pub-
lished in the March 2014 issue of The Champion magazine, a publica-
tion of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
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1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
3. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
4. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
5. Id. at 2399–40, 2408.
6. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004). The majority in
J.D.B. explained that its decision was not constrained by the
Alvarado decision, in that Alvarado simply held that failing to con-
sider age in the analysis was not “objectively unreasonable under
the deferential standard of review set forth by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat.
1214.” J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405. After J.D.B., of course, the fail-
ure of a court to make this consideration would be clear error.
7. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2398.
8. Id. at 2401 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321
(2009) (“frighteningly high percentage”) and Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (“inherently compelling pressures”)). 
9. Id. at 2413 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the
Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J. L.
& POL’Y 109 (2012). 
11. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
12. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
13. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599–600.
15. Gault, 387 U.S. at 52.
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
The landmark trilogy of United States Supreme Court juve-nile sentencing decisions over the last decade is wellknown. Starting with the Roper v. Simmons1 ruling in 2005
that abolished the death penalty for offenders under the age of
18, the Court has developed what might be called a “kids are
different” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The last three
years has seen the Court first outlaw life without parole sen-
tences for juvenile non-homicide offenders2 and then prohibit
the mandatory imposition of this sentence on any offender
under the age of 18.3
During this same time period, and utilizing a similar ratio-
nale, the high Court applied this “kids are different” approach
to its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in the constitutional
consideration of custodial interrogations. In J.D.B. v. North
Carolina,4 the U.S. Supreme Court held that law enforcement
must consider a suspect’s age when weighing whether he is in
custody and entitled to Miranda warnings.5 The decision
marked a reversal of sorts, as only seven years earlier the Court
had rejected the proposition that clearly established U.S.
Supreme Court law required a consideration of age in the
Miranda custody calculus.6 In J.D.B., however, the Court saw
no need to “blind [itself] to the commonsense reality” that
children “will often feel bound to submit to police question-
ing.”7 It so held, in part, based on a concern about the “fright-
eningly high percentage of people” who confess to crimes that
“they never committed” as a result of the “inherently com-
pelling pressures” of custodial interrogation—a problem “all
the more troubling” and “acute,” the Court warned, when the
subject is a juvenile.8 Even the four dissenting justices did “not
dispute that many suspects who are under 18 will be more sus-
ceptible to police pressure than the average adult.”9
Scholars have remarked that the J.D.B. decision represents a
reinvigoration of the high Court’s jurisprudence of half a cen-
tury ago that required special protections for youth in the
interrogation room.10 Indeed, long-ago U.S. Supreme Court
decisions like Haley v. Ohio,11 Gallegos v. Colorado,12 and In re
Gault13 explicitly recognized the differences between youth
and adults in this context. While these cases are from another
era, J.D.B. has given renewed meaning to several oft-repeated
quotations from them, including: “[W]e cannot believe that a
lad of tender years is a match for the police [during custodial
interrogations],”14 and “[A]uthoritative opinion has cast for-
midable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘con-
fessions’ by children.”15
In light of J.D.B. and the revitalization of a “kids are differ-
ent” approach to custodial interrogations, this article high-
lights and examines issues that judges should carefully scruti-
nize when faced with a juvenile confession given as a result of
police questioning. These considerations include Miranda-
related issues, the confession’s voluntariness under a due-
process analysis, and the heightened risk of unreliable or false
confessions from youth. 
POLICE INTERROGATIONS, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND
THE NEW JUVENILE JURISPRUDENCE
Before considering the particular issues faced by judges in
cases in which juveniles are interrogated, a brief synopsis of
some of the common, modern-day tactics used during custo-
dial interrogations is appropriate. Almost five decades ago, in
Miranda v. Arizona itself, the U.S. Supreme Court explained
that police interrogations entail “inherently compelling pres-
sures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely.”16 To elucidate the “heavy toll” of custodial interro-
gation, the Court cited several police interrogation training
manuals, including Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid’s Criminal
Scrutinizing Confessions in a New
Era of Juvenile Jurisprudence
Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider, & Steven A. Drizin
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(G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds. 2010).  
30. See Northwestern Law, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Wrongful Convictions
of Youth, Spotlight (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.law.northwest
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index.html (highlighting the Tennessee cases of People v. Brendan
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31. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–70 (2010).
32. Graham, 560 U.S. at 77–79. 
33. Id.
34. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (citing Brief for
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner-Appellant 21–22 (collecting empirical stud-
ies that “illustrate the heightened risk of false confessions from
youth”)). 
Interrogation and Confessions.17 Now in its fifth edition, Crimi-
nal Interrogation and Confessions promotes the Reid Tech-
nique—which to this day markets itself as “the most widely
used approach to question subjects in the world.”18
The Reid Technique teaches a nine-step interrogation
method that is used to extract confessions—a process that it
cautions should only be used when the police are confident the
suspect is responsible for the crime being investigated.19 At the
outset, interrogators are taught to isolate the suspect from fam-
ily or support. The interview then begins with a rapport-build-
ing period, during which investigators will often allow the sus-
pect to provide a narrative of his activities on the day of the
crime. After a short break, the investigator is trained to re-enter
the interrogation room and directly accuse the suspect of the
crime. During this period, the officer is taught to assert unwa-
vering confidence in the suspect’s guilt and discount any
claims of innocence asserted.20 The goal of this portion of the
interrogation is to make the suspect feel hopelessly trapped.
When this is accomplished, confession is offered as a “carrot”
to the suspect—in other words, as a way out of the suspect’s
predicament. Through a process scholars call minimization,
interrogators indicate that the benefits of confessing outweigh
the costs of maintaining innocence.21 They may ask a murder
suspect, for example, whether the murder was the unplanned
result of a moment of anger or an “accident”—which are, they
intimate, different from a premeditated murder (although it’s
never said how the two differ). Ultimately, if an interrogator
successfully obtains an admission of responsibility from the
suspect, he is taught to elicit a narrative and detailed version of
the criminal act.22
While no doubt effective in eliciting true confessions, the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that these interrogation
tactics can be so psychologically powerful as to elicit false con-
fessions at a “frighteningly” high rate.23 The false confession
first stems from law enforcement’s mischaracterization of an
innocent person as guilty and its decision to use these power-
ful tactics on that factually inno-
cent person.24 The “inherently
compelling pressures” described
above can then convince even an
innocent person to admit respon-
sibility.25 Ultimately, the resulting
false confession can often sound
convincing and detailed, particu-
larly if crime scene facts are made
known to the suspect through
media reports, local gossip, or,
most often, the inadvertent, sug-
gestive questioning of the inter-
rogator.26 From national reports like CBS’s 60 Minutes27 to
countless local newspaper articles, stories of false confes-
sions—and resulting wrongful convictions—have become
ubiquitous in the news cycle. 
Interrogators employ these and [other] psychologically
coercive tactics on even the youngest of suspects. While offi-
cers may generally recognize that juveniles are more vulnera-
ble or suggestible,28 in practice, many officers simply do not
alter their methods when interrogating a young suspect.29
Concrete examples abound. In the last few months alone, Ten-
nessee law enforcement officers were caught on tape threaten-
ing several teenage suspects with the death penalty—or a life-
time of prison rape—during interrogations.30 The appropriate-
ness of these tactics is highly debatable for any suspect, but it
is particularly difficult to stomach their use when the person
being questioned is only a teenager.
Due to juveniles’ “vulnerab[ility] or susceptib[ility] to . . .
outside pressures,”31 their “difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences,”32 and their “limited understandings of the
criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors
within it,”33 the J.D.B. court acknowledged what the research
supports: children and teenagers are particularly vulnerable
during custodial interrogations.34 And this country’s high
“[I]nterrogation
tactics can be so
psychologically
powerful as 
to elicit false 
confessions
at a 
‘frighteningly’
high rate.”
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vention on the Rights of the Child, which require immediate
counsel for all minors taken into custody and before interroga-
tion). The European Court of Human Rights is an international
court that hears cases alleging violations of the civil and political
rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights by
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ple v. Barr, No. 1-05-3505, 1-05-3699 Cons. (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 28,
2007) (unpublished order).  
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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Court is not alone in this con-
clusion: international treaties
such as Article 37 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the
Child—and a “significant
number of [other] relevant
international law materials”—
demand that all minors receive
legal assistance before interro-
gation while in police custody
because of an increased risk of
coerced or false confession.35 Given this backdrop, it is essen-
tial that judges carefully scrutinize all aspects of a juvenile’s
confession. The sections below outline some of the particular
issues for consideration. 
PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION ISSUES
When dealing with a case involving a confession from a
juvenile, judges may face a variety of arguments from the
defense as to why the confession should be kept from the jury.
Given the evidentiary power of confession evidence, a judge’s
ruling on these pretrial motions might determine the entire
outcome of the case. Indeed, one leading legal evidence trea-
tise has remarked that “the introduction of a confession makes
the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous.”36 Examples
abound of innocent confessors being convicted even in light of
overwhelming evidence of innocence, such as seminal DNA
from a juvenile sexual assault and murder victim that excludes
the confessor.37
A confession must be suppressed where it is obtained in vio-
lation of Miranda v. Arizona or is otherwise involuntary. For a
statement to be admitted into evidence in compliance with
Miranda, a suspect must knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel when
subjected to a custodial interrogation.38 The voluntariness of a
confession is evaluated using a totality of the circumstances
test that considers both the individual vulnerabilities of the
suspect and law enforcement’s tactics in eliciting the confes-
sion.39 Each of these questions must be analyzed more rigor-
ously when the confessor is a juvenile. 
THE MIRANDA QUESTION: WHAT IS “CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION”?
Sometimes, a law enforcement officer will elicit a confession
from a juvenile without ever giving Miranda warnings at all,
reasoning that the warnings were not required because the
child was either not in custody or was not interrogated. The
custody inquiry asks courts to consider whether an objective
person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances.40
This custody question was at the forefront of J.D.B. In that
case, a 13-year-old seventh grader suspected of burglary was in
social studies class when an investigator arrived at the school
and informed administrators—including the assistant princi-
pal and a uniformed school resource officer—that he needed to
question the boy.41 The resource officer then went into the
social studies classroom and removed the student, taking him
into a closed-door room where he was met by the assistant
principal and the investigator.42 After some small talk, the
investigator, with aid from the assistant principal, questioned
the boy, leading him to confess to the burglaries.43 No Miranda
warnings were ever read.44
The admissibility of the schoolhouse confession became the
centerpiece of the litigation: three North Carolina courts
affirmed its admissibility by ruling that J.D.B. was not in cus-
tody at the time of the admissions while refusing to consider
the child’s age as part of the inquiry.45 The high Court, how-
ever, disagreed, reversing and ordering a reconsideration of the
custody determination to account for all relevant circum-
stances, including the suspect’s age.46
The import of a consideration of age in this custody calcu-
lus cannot be understated. The average young person likely
has no idea that he could ever, under any circumstances,
choose to terminate an encounter with a law enforcement offi-
cer. Kids are taught from birth to respect the authority of adults
and are punished when they don’t—even moreso when the
elder is a police officer. Unless he clearly understands his right
to do so, it is difficult to imagine any juvenile would ever com-
prehend that he could choose to simply ignore an officer’s
wishes to speak to him and unilaterally end the encounter. 
After J.D.B., judges must rigorously question any admis-
sion obtained by police without Miranda warnings regardless
of where, when, or how it was obtained. Traditional questions
regarding whether the suspect was handcuffed, or whether an
adult concerned with the welfare of the child was present,
remain important but may be secondary to the simple fact that
the suspect is a kid. Any Miranda-less confession at a school
is clearly problematic after J.D.B., as such a child would have
to muster not only the wherewithal to withstand the investi-
gator but also, in all likelihood, the orders of school adminis-
trators or resource officers to cooperate—all in an environ-
ment where students are prohibited from leaving their class-
room unless they have an adult’s permission.  Even police
“[A] judge’s ruling 
on... pretrial 
[suppression]
motions might
determine the
entire outcome 
of the case.”
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questioning of a young person in the living room of his own
home, with his mother by his side, raises the question of
whether a reasonable child has the practical ability to say to
the officer: “I don’t want to answer your questions and would
like you to leave.” 
The question of what constitutes an “interrogation” of a
juvenile suspect also deserves new attention after J.D.B. An
interrogation occurs when police should know that their
words or actions are likely to elicit an incriminating
response.47 Therefore, even if a suspect is in custody, any
Miranda-less confession he makes is admissible if it was not
made in response to an interrogation. Where an officer knows
he is dealing with a juvenile, the question becomes whether
words or actions that would not constitute an interrogation of
an adult suspect might when the person being questioned is a
juvenile. 
This very question is at issue in the Michigan case of People
v. White.48 Seventeen-year-old armed-robbery suspect Kadeem
White was taken into custody and given his Miranda warnings.
He asserted his right to remain silent. Shortly thereafter, the
officer said: “Okay. The only thing I can tell you is this, and I’m
not asking you any questions, I’m just telling you. I hope that
the gun is in a place where nobody can get a hold of it and
nobody else can get hurt by it, okay. All right.” Kadeem
responded with a brief admission that the State successfully
sought to introduce into evidence.49
While a five-judge panel of the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the admissibility of the statement, it did so over the
vigorous dissent of two justices. Citing J.D.B. and other
authority, Justice Kelly argued that the investigator “should
have recognized that defendant’s age made him especially sus-
ceptible to subtle compulsive efforts and that such conduct
would likely elicit an incriminating response.”50 Justice
Cavanaugh explained that Kadeem’s youth and inexperience
increased the likelihood that he would feel compelled to
respect the officer and perceive the officer’s statements as
requiring a response.51
Other cases are likely to arise where judges will be asked to
consider claims by law enforcement that officers’ words or
actions that led to statements by juveniles were not “interroga-
tions.” Whether the police words or actions took place without
Miranda warnings—or if they occurred after an invocation of
rights by the minor, as in White—J.D.B. suggests that there
may be a distinction regarding what constitutes an “interroga-
tion” when the suspect is a child as opposed to an adult. 
THE MIRANDA QUESTION:
WHAT IS A PROPER WAIVER
OF MIRANDA RIGHTS? 
The question of whether a
suspect knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waives his
Miranda rights is a separate
inquiry that is governed by a
“totality of the circumstances”
test that has long included con-
sideration of the suspect’s age.52
But after J.D.B.’s express concern
about the unique susceptibility
of youth during custodial interrogation, judges would be well
served to pay careful attention to the methods by which police
obtain waivers from juvenile suspects. 
Three decades ago, in a renowned study, psychologist
Thomas Grisso concluded that the majority of juveniles under
15 simply did not understand at least one of their Miranda
rights even when properly read to them.53 Even with the
increased repetition of Miranda warnings on television shows
and in pop culture, more recent studies have replicated these
findings.54 And so-called “juvenile Miranda warnings,” which
law enforcement often claims are simpler, more kid-friendly
warnings that ensure a proper waiver, generally use language
that still requires at least an eighth-grade level of comprehen-
sion, far above the intelligence level of many young confes-
sors.55
Consider the case of an 11-year-old Florida murder suspect,
who was administered Miranda warnings slowly and carefully
before his questioning and admission. Three experts, including
one retained by the State, all independently concluded that
despite these precautions, this boy simply could not under-
stand his rights.56 Or consider the case of a 12-year-old honor
roll student in Arkansas, who initially signed a Miranda waiver
and made a confession even though he later made clear that he
had no idea what the word “waiver” meant. When the law
enforcement officer misinformed the boy of the word’s mean-
ing, his confession was suppressed and the murder charges
eventually dropped.57 Even older juveniles, such as almost-17-
year-old Nga Truong, have given confessions that were later
suppressed despite properly read Miranda warnings when offi-
cers downplayed the rights’ significance.58
The lessons of these cases and the Grisso study is that for
certain juveniles, judges should consider starting with a pre-
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59. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, REDUCING RISKS: AN EXECUTIVE’S
GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE JUVENILE INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION
(2012).
60. The recommended language is as follows:
1. You have the right to remain silent. That means you do not
have to say anything.
2. Anything you say can be used against you in court.
3. You have the right to get help from a lawyer right now.
4. If you cannot pay a lawyer, we will get you one here for free.
5. You have the right to stop this interview at any time.
6. Do you want to talk to me?
7. Do you want to have a lawyer with you while you talk to me?
The officer should stop between each of the seven steps to assure
that the child can adequately explain back the admonition in his own
words. Id. 
61. Hart v. A.G., 323 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 2010).
62. Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
63. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (applying North Car-
olina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), which is also a case where the
suspect was an adult).
64. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011).
65. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)
66. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986)
sumption that the suspect could
not properly waive his rights.
Only with particularized expert
evaluations to the contrary, or
other evidentiary facts that sug-
gest the child was either uniquely
able to understand his warnings
or that law enforcement officers
followed best practices and used
special precautions to guarantee
Miranda understanding, should
this presumption be rebutted.
Law enforcement best prac-
tices for Miranda have been recently modernized in a juvenile
interview and interrogation guide entitled Reducing Risks: An
Executive’s Guide to Effective Juvenile Interview and Interroga-
tion, developed by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (“IACP”) in conjunction with the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Adjudication and the authors of this
article.59 The guide advises officers to “read each warning
slowly, stopping to ask the child after each individual warning
to explain it back in his or her own words.” The guide also
offers proposed language for administering the rights,60
including a requirement to inform young suspects of the pos-
sible adult criminal consequences of the crime. Judges should
be concerned when officers stray from these guidelines, espe-
cially for younger juveniles or those without prior law
enforcement experience. However, even for those juveniles
who do have significant previous interactions with police,
judges should carefully consider what that experience
entailed. So, for example, if a juvenile had prior interactions
with police for minor offenses—and these interactions
resulted in a confession followed by a diversion out of the
court system—this experience may have actually taught the
child that a confession would only help secure his release and
would not, in fact, “be used against him,” despite what he may
have been told.
To that end, judges should take to heart a true “totality of
the circumstances” approach when it comes to juvenile
waivers. A body of case law is developing that demonstrates
the importance of considering the entirety of the interroga-
tion, not just the admonitions and the waiver itself, when it
comes to this analysis. In Hart v. A.G.,61 for example, the inter-
rogator “went to great lengths” to explain the Miranda warn-
ings to the suspect; the confession was suppressed, however,
when the interrogator later told the suspect that “honesty
wouldn’t hurt him,” which the court recognized was incom-
patible with Miranda. Other videotaped interrogations have
shown investigators telling a suspect that “he is going to talk”
immediately before reading warnings that were supposedly
meant to relay to the suspect he had a right not to talk. 
The “kids are different” approach to custodial interrogation
also may call into question seemingly established U.S. Supreme
Court precedents like Davis v. U.S.62 and Berghuis v. Thomp-
kins.63 Those cases require suspects to unambiguously invoke
their rights to silence or an attorney. Both cases, however,
involve adult suspects, and recent categorical statements about
juveniles made by the high Court referencing their “limited
understanding[] of the criminal justice system and the roles of
the institutional actors within it”—not to mention the obvious
fact that many youth simply do not speak in such a clear or
assertive manner—are incompatible with rules that require
kids to make steadfast, savvy demands for counsel. Therefore,
if a juvenile says almost nothing for hours on end before fold-
ing under questioning—like 17-year-old Jonathan Doody64
did—or makes an equivocal request for counsel, judges may be
forced to grapple with whether Davis or Thompkins still applies
to a young confessor in a post-J.D.B. “kids are different” world.
The same may hold true when a juvenile asks for and is denied
the guidance of a trusted adult like a parent during interroga-
tion; Fare v. Michael C.,65 which held that a teenager’s request
to speak with his probation officer during interrogation was
not an invocation of Miranda, is now four decades old and
arguably obsolete in light of the high Court’s new juvenile
jurisprudence.
THE VOLUNTARINESS QUESTION: HOW TO CONSIDER
INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITIES AND QUESTIONABLE
TACTICS WITH KIDS
Separate and apart from Miranda questions, if there is coer-
cive police activity, due process requires the suppression of a
confession when the totality of circumstances, taking into
account the individual vulnerabilities of the suspect, renders
the confession involuntary.66 The recent juvenile jurisprudence
affects both the inquiry into individual vulnerabilities and
coercive police activity when it comes to young suspects.
As to the former, young age has always been considered a
vulnerability during interrogation, but the J.D.B. decision and
sentencing jurisprudence reinvigorates the fact that age is
more than a number. Even the four J.D.B. dissenters agreed
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with the majority that all juveniles under 18 are “more sus-
ceptible to police pressure.”67 Indeed, so does law enforce-
ment, including the proprietors of the Reid Technique: They
explain that juveniles are more suggestible and advise inter-
rogators to exercise “extreme caution and care” when interro-
gating them.68 Judges should thus inquire as to what special
precautions officers took when questioning a youth. And it is
not adequate if the only special precautions taken amount to
securing the presence of a “youth officer” or obtaining
parental consent. Courts have recognized that a police officer
who is forced to alter roles and suddenly act in the best inter-
est of a child as a “youth officer” may be no more help than a
“potted plant.”69 At the same time, scholars have persuasively
argued that the presence of even a well-meaning parent can
actually add to the coercive nature of the interrogation for a
child.70
The question of whether certain police tactics are acceptable
for adult suspects yet too coercive for a child is perhaps the
more robust inquiry. To this end, judges should look to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police best-practices
guide described earlier. This executive police manual provides
a detailed account of how (and how not) to question juvenile
suspects, with special attention given to ensuring that police
do not draw faulty conclusions from common adolescent
behaviors, limiting juvenile questioning sessions to an hour
during the daytime, advising police to use only open-ended
questions, and instructing interrogators to refrain from making
even indirect suggestions of “help” in exchange for a confes-
sion.71 When officers stray from these guideposts, judges
should question their tactics. Judges also should be open to
hearing from an expert on police interrogations of juveniles as
they consider the police tactics used and the ultimate volun-
tariness of the confession. 
Additionally, judges should pay special attention to any use
of deception by police officers during an interrogation of a
youth. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested (in a
case involving a 20-year-old Marine) that interrogators are not
prohibited from using deception on suspects during question-
ing72—and the Reid Technique also allows interrogators to lie
as a last resort—even Reid draws a line at using this tactic with
children.73 If evidence surfaces that police used deceptive tac-
tics on the young suspect—whether it be false claims that
other witnesses have named him or even suggestions that the
consequences of confessing are less because of the suspect’s
youth—judges should pay
special heed and strongly
consider suppressing the
confession.
REASONABLE DOUBT
DESPITE A CONFESSION
J.D.B’s assertion that the
risk of false confession is “all
the more acute” with a juve-
nile suspect is well based in
research. The Court relied on
a brief submitted by the authors of this article as part of our
work with the Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth
(“CWCY”), wherein we pointed to a series of empirical and
laboratory studies that show juveniles falsely confess at a sig-
nificantly greater rate than adults.74 These confessions, more-
over, can be startlingly detailed. Nearly one-fifth of DNA exon-
erations, for example, include false confessions, and 95% of
those confessions included descriptive facts that seemingly
only the true perpetrator would know.75
Determining the reliability—or truth—of the actual confes-
sion in the context of bench trials should be done systemati-
cally and carefully.76 Judges should begin by closely examining
the confession itself to determine if it “fits” with the physical
evidence, other witness statements, and the State’s overall the-
ory of the crime. Every detail, big and small, should be scruti-
nized. For instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
recently ordered a new trial for 16-year-old confessor Daniel
Villegas, in part because his confession named co-perpetrators
whose participation was impossible because they were in cus-
tody at the time of the crime.77 In other questionable confes-
sions, however, even smaller details, such as the location in the
house of the crime, were inconsistent with the physical evi-
dence. In these cases, when faced with adjudicating the truth
of the confession, judges must force themselves to come up
with adequate answers to tough questions before convicting—
questions like, why would a true confessor be unable to accu-
rately relay facts about the crime scene? or, is there an ade-
quate explanation as to why the suspect would truly confess to
a heinous crime yet lie about mundane details such as the
exact location of the offense?    
After determining which facts do not “fit,” judges should
closely examine the accurate details. This process involves
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analyzing the confession for con-
tamination—or the disclosure of
crime scene facts to the suspect
before the confession. A confes-
sion can be contaminated by
neighborhood gossip, or, in more
high-profile cases, through media
reports. A judge should consider
(and allow into evidence) what
information was in the public
domain; if the confession only
contains details already known to
the general public, the confession
may prove little. The same holds true for accurate details that
could be explained through innocent knowledge: a young con-
fessor who was also the first person to come upon a dead body
and report it to police, for example, would be able to describe
the deceased’s clothes or body position even if he did not com-
mit the murder. 
By far the most common source of contamination, however,
comes from the interrogators themselves. During a pressure-
packed interrogation, police investigators may unintentionally
reveal crime scene facts to the suspect, despite training not to
do so. The improper use of leading or forced choice questions
enables the suspect to infer the answers the interrogator is
seeking. A suspect’s confession may also be contaminated if the
interrogator shows a suspect crime scene photos or takes him
to the location of the crime.
Finding this source of contamination can be done accu-
rately only when the interrogation is recorded in full. In such
a case, judges should examine the confession to determine if
the source of each detail truly and originally came from the
confessor or the interrogator.78 Some confessions literally
include no details that were not first proffered by the ques-
tioner, and appellate courts have placed the burden on the
State to prove a lack of contamination in order to uphold a
conviction based mostly on a confession.79 A highly contami-
nated confession is wholly unreliable. 
When the interrogation is unrecorded, an accurate evalua-
tion of the reliability of the confession is more difficult. At the
outset, however, given the national trend toward laws requiring
the electronic recording of custodial interrogations—a policy
recommended by the IACP and one that certainly benefits law
enforcement officers who are conducting legal and proper cus-
todial interrogations80—it is fair for judges to have a heightened
level of suspicion when the technology to record was available
yet not utilized by police. Appellate judges, including Chief
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, have articulated these sus-
picions when interrogations go unrecorded.81 Ultimately, the
failure to record the entire interrogation in such circumstances
should be given great weight in assessing both the admissibility
and reliability of the confession.82
But even without a recording, judges can examine the issue
of contamination by allowing into evidence police reports,
medical examinations, witness interviews, and any other infor-
mation that reveals what details the police knew before the
interrogation and the source of those details. Such evidence is
not hearsay because it is not being offered for the truth of the
facts known to police, only as evidence that the police knew
this information before the interrogation. If the only accurate
details in the final confession were already known by law
enforcement, this is, at least, circumstantial evidence of conta-
mination and an unreliable confession. 
Finally, in assessing a confession’s reliability, judges should
give great weight when confessors lead the police to accurate
information or evidence that they did not know at the time of
the interrogation. This kind of corroboration—the name of an
accomplice, the location of the murder weapon or the bloody
clothes, the fruits of an armed robbery—is what the Reid Tech-
nique refers to as “independent corroboration”83 and is the
most convincing evidence that a confession is true.
CONCLUSION
It can often be very difficult even for experienced and skep-
tical judges to recognize when a confession is problematic. In
his study of the first 40 proven false-confession cases amongst
those in which defendants were later exonerated by DNA evi-
dence, Professor Brandon Garrett found that in virtually every
case, judges denied defendants’ pretrial motions to suppress,
decisions which were then upheld by appellate courts.84 After
all, it is hard for even judges to imagine that anyone would
confess to a serious crime they did not commit. But the evi-
dence continues to grow that false confessions happen with a
level of frequency—especially in cases involving teenagers and
children—that demands close scrutiny from our judicial sys-
tem. It is the hope of the authors that this article will guide
judges in their efforts to scrutinize such cases, ultimately
ensuring both that juvenile confessions were lawfully obtained
and that they are reliable evidence of guilt. 
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Judges of course know that in the 1966 case of Miranda v.Arizona,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that aconfession cannot be admitted into evidence unless a
waiver of the Miranda rights (the rights to remain silent, to
avoid self-incrimination, to obtain legal counsel before and
during police questioning, and to obtain free legal counsel if
indigent) is made “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,”
and that the 1967 ruling in the case In re Gault2 extended these
protections to juveniles. It is well known, too, that there is a
substantial body of case law and commentary addressing fac-
tors courts need to consider in evaluating whether a juvenile
or adult’s waiver of Miranda rights was valid.3
What is less well known by judges is to how assess the con-
fession. Experts are often relied on to help understand the psy-
chological factors relevant to a Miranda waiver. In particular,
experts provide guidance into the voluntariness and the valid-
ity of a confession. 
Expert testimony is generally of two types.  The first involves
an explanation of the psychologically coercive nature of either
interrogations in general or the interrogation of the specific indi-
vidual.  Such testimony explains how interrogations can lead to
false or unreliable statements.  Oftentimes the testimony
involves a discussion of relevant research on the “science” of
false confessions.  In this type of expert testimony, the defendant
is not typically evaluated because that expert is not a forensic
clinician, someone who can assess the particular defendant’s
confession rather than only talk about confessions in general.
A second type of testimony is more defendant focused,
addressing the specific interrogation and how it can produce a
false confession.  The expert—ordinarily a clinical psycholo-
gist or other type of mental health professional—not only
reviews the interrogation itself but also conducts a psycholog-
ical evaluation on the defendant to assess whether there are
particular psychological characteristics that place him or her at
greater risk than others of providing unreliable or false infor-
mation in light of the interrogation tactics used.  As is the case
when determining the validity of other aspects of a Miranda
waiver, whether a confession is deemed true or false is assessed
by the trier of fact and decided on the “totality of circum-
stances” standard.
The increasing use of mental health testimony in alleged
false-confession cases is likely due in part to more scientific
research in the area, more extensive attorney training, anecdo-
tal data from highly publicized cases (e.g., Central Park Jogger
case), as well as data collected  from the Innocence Project.4
The Innocence Project estimates that individuals had falsely
confessed or provided incriminating information in approxi-
mately 25% of cases.5 Another study from Gross and Shaffer6
examined a larger sample of exonerations in a joint project
from the University of Michigan Law School and the Center of
Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of
Law. Out of 873 exonerees, 15% had confessed to their alleged
crime (25% if only looking at homicide crimes). 
Confessions and self-incriminating statements produced
during police interrogations carry great weight with the trier of
fact and become crucial components in the State proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
offense.  Leo7 reports that 80% of suspects waive their rights,
while Wrightsman and Kassin8 detail how confessions are pro-
duced in 50% of criminal cases and are challenged in court in
20% of cases.  Although this research is now nearly 20 years
old, it is this author’s personal experience that in cases in
which a defendant goes to trial, the confessions are challenged
at an even greater rate today. 
Expert Testimony in Juvenile 
and Adult Alleged False-
Confession Cases
I. Bruce Frumkin
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In 2004, Drizen and Leo9 analyzed 125 cases of proven false
confessions in the United States between 1971 and 2002. A
total of 63% of false confessors were under the age of 25, and
32% of this sample were juveniles. Tepfer, Nirider, and Tri-
carico10 analyzed 103 exonerees throughout the country who
were implicated in crimes before their 20th birthdays.  All but
four of the cases involved murder and/or a sex offense.  Analy-
sis showed 31% of these youth falsely confessed.    This data
also strongly suggested that younger children are more likely
to falsely confess than older children in that 69% of 11–14-
year-olds falsely confessed, compared to 38% of 15-year-olds,
19% of 16-year-olds, and 43% of 17-year-olds.  Youths aged 18
and 19 falsely confessed at a rate of 15%.  It is not known why
there was a spike in the 17-year-old group.  These data are con-
sistent with the Gross and Shaffer study that showed of those
exonerated juveniles 11-14 years of age, 74% falsely con-
fessed, and of those 15-17 years of age, 34% falsely confessed.11
Although there have been many documented false confes-
sions in recent years, it is impossible to determine the rate of
false confessions.  This is because the police usually keep no
tally of the number of suspects interrogated annually, and, of
those departments that do, no data are kept concerning per-
centages that result in a true confession, no confession, or a
false confession.  A suspect, despite law enforcement claims to
the contrary, may even deny having confessed in the first place.
In addition, a true confession may also later be retracted by the
defendant.  As this author has written previously, a confession
is often not true or false in a dichotomous fashion.12 There are
varying degrees of truth regarding a particular confession.
Even an essentially true confession can be challenged in court
if an aspect of that confession erroneously places the defendant
in a more incriminating light than what actually transpired.  
It would seem that the percentage of juveniles who falsely
confess, particularly in cases that are tried in juvenile court, is
an underestimation of those percentages described in the exon-
eration studies.  Youths who are tried in juvenile court likely
confess at substantially higher rates than adults because these
false confessions will remain undiscovered.  Particularly if the
charges are not serious and/or the penalties not severe, cases
are less likely to be appealed.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that
a juvenile wrongly convicted in juvenile court will ever have
his conviction reversed based on DNA testing, which is
unlikely to have been performed.  This is consistent with the
relatively low 3% false-confession rate among both juvenile
and adult exonerees who were charged with nonviolent crimes
as reported in the Gross and Shaffer study.13
Defense attorneys have used
mental health professionals to sup-
press incriminating statements at
the pretrial level when the volun-
tariness of a confession is ques-
tioned.  In Crane v. Kentucky,14 the
Supreme Court held that a confes-
sion’s reliability may also be chal-
lenged at trial, even if the confes-
sion had been initially deemed voluntary. Mental health
experts have routinely been used in these cases as well.
The use of expert testimony in alleged false- or coerced-con-
fession cases, both by defense attorneys and usually by prose-
cutors as rebuttal, are fraught with a number of pitfalls or diffi-
culties in the evaluative techniques used and the testimony
proffered. One difficulty is the expert being unaware of inter-
rogative techniques that are usually used and the reasons why
an individual may falsely confess.
INTERROGATION PROCEDURES
In a disputed confession case, an assessment needs to con-
sider the specific methodology of the interrogation in question
as well as the types of interrogation procedures used by law
enforcement in general. The Reid Technique15 is the most
widely used method in the United States to extract confessions
from those individuals law enforcement believes are guilty of
the offense.  This technique is a nine-step process to obtain a
confession.  Simply described, it is one in which police con-
front the suspect with the knowledge that they know he or she
was the person who committed the crime.  Police then present
two hypotheses to the suspect as to why the crime was com-
mitted.  One of the hypotheses helps the suspect justify or
excuse the crime, perhaps by affixing moral blame on an
accomplice or the victim, or by emphasizing the suspect’s
impaired mental state.  The other hypothesis is that the suspect
is some type of evil person or monster who intended to cause
the harm.  The suspect’s denials of guilt are handled, objections
are overcome, and the police prevent the suspect from emo-
tionally withdrawing from the situation at hand.  The police
give the suspect a chance to choose what he or she thinks
would be the more acceptable or morally blameless explana-
tion for the crime.  Eventually a confession is obtained.  
Drizen and Leo16 describe the pathways to a false confes-
sion. It begins with what they term as the Misclassification
Error, in which law enforcement uses behavioral analysis to
make what they believe to be a determination whether a sus-
9. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confes-
sions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 894 (2004).
10. Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider, & Lynda M. Tricarico, Arrest-
ing Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV.
891 (2010).
11. Gross & Shafer, supra note 6, at 60, Table 17.
12. I. Bruce Frumkin, Psychological Evaluation in Miranda Waiver and
Confession Cases, in CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY IN THE CRIMINAL
FORENSIC SETTING 135 (Robert L. Denney & James P. Sullivan eds.,
2008).
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14. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
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the collection of Dr. Reid’s materials and other publications, John
E. Reid & Associates, Inc., available at http://www.reid.com.
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TIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian Meiss-
ner eds., 2010).
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pect is guilty or innocent.  Often
described as part of the pre-inter-
view, a properly trained detective
acts as human lie detector
whereby the suspect’s verbal
(e.g., word choice), nonverbal
(e.g., posture, eye contact), and
paralinguistic (e.g., response
length and delivery) behaviors
are analyzed to assess guilt.  For
example, an overly anxious,
slouching, and guarded suspect shows characteristics suppos-
edly indicative of deception and guilt. Research that examines
the validity of these factors, however, does not support this
behavioral-analysis approach as a reliable means of assessing
deception.17 Law enforcement is no more accurate (56%) than
lay people (54%) in assessing deception;  police, however, are
more certain of the accuracy of their assessments.  For both
groups, distinguishing between truth tellers and liars was not
markedly better than chance accuracy.
A second pathway is what Drizen and Leo18 term the Coercion
Error, whereby using the Reid technique, law enforcement uses
psychologically coercive means aimed at attacking a suspect’s
individual vulnerabilities as described above. The third pathway,
the Contamination Error, misleads the suspect by presenting false
evidence that does not exist and/or providing details of the
offense to the suspect that only the true culprit would know.19
A new approach for interviewing suspects is the PEACE
approach: Planning and Preparation, Engage and Explain,
Obtain an Account, Closure, and Evaluation.20 PEACE was
designed to have interviewers ask questions to establish the
truth, obtain reliable and accurate information, act fairly, and
be open-minded.  Acting fairly and being open-minded regard-
ing a suspect’s guilt are not trademarks of the Reid technique.
In fact, the PEACE approach was designed to be a non-
accusatory means of obtaining a confession. In England and
Wales, 120,000 officers have been trained in the PEACE
approach following some high-profile, false-confession cases.
There has been a pilot project in training officers in the PEACE
approach in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and
Labrador.21 In contrast, there does not seem to be any training
currently taking place in the United States.  The “jury” is out
regarding the effectiveness of eliciting confessions using the
PEACE approach versus the traditional Reid method.  Never-
theless, there have been no reported false confessions obtained
using the PEACE method.
TYPES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
A number of different models have been developed to
explain why people falsely confess.  These models have been
given different names and combined and/or separated into
various permutations.  The following is not meant to imply
these are the only reasons why someone may falsely confess.
Rather, it is to provide five descriptive examples to help
explain why some people may confess to crimes they did not
commit.  
Kassin and Wrightsman identity three types of false confes-
sions:22 (1) voluntary false confession, whereby a suspect con-
fesses willingly because of a need for notoriety, need to protect
a friend or relative, or a pathological need to be punished; (2)
coerced-compliant false confession, in which the suspect con-
fesses to escape or avoid the stressful interrogation process or to
achieve some immediate goal, such as less punishment (implied
by the police) or a reward for cooperation (e.g., phone call to a
wife, cigarette break, etc.); and (3) coerced-internalized false
confession, in which a suspect, after being subjected to intense
pressure and suggestion by police, begins to internalize or
believe falsely that he or she committed the crime. Often indi-
viduals do not trust their own memories because they may have
been high on drugs or were in a psychotic state around the time
period of the offense.  McCann identifies another category, the
coerced-reactive false confession, in which the suspect confesses
due to threats or pressure from an outside entity, such as a fel-
low gang member or an abusive spouse.23 A final category is the
coerced-substituted false confession, in which a suspect has com-
mitted a finite number of similar offenses (e.g., stealing cars,
burglaries) within a short, specific time period, yet confesses to
a greater number of like offenses than actually committed
because he or she does not remember the specifics of each and
every offense.24 This at times can be explained in light of the
police questioning the suspect about many unsolved cases,
some of which were not committed by the suspect but some of
which were.
RISK FACTORS FOR FALSE CONFESSIONS
Research has shown a number of risk factors associated
with those who are susceptible to interrogative influence and,
by extension, are at greater risk for giving a false confession (or
a confession that, while essentially true, places the defendant
in a more responsible or aggravating situation than warranted).
Research summarized by Gudjonsson has shown that low
intelligence, anxiety, memory impairment, sleep deprivation,
and certain personality characteristics (including compliance,
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acquiescence, poor assertiveness, and suggestibility) place an
individual at risk of succumbing to police demands.25
Juveniles are particularly vulnerable to interrogation tactics.
They are more apt to make decisions based on immediate gain
rather than looking at long-term consequences of a behavior.
Law enforcement is allowed to use deception as part of the
interrogation, such as lying about evidence and misrepresent-
ing the nature or seriousness of the charges.  Although police
officers are not allowed to make direct promises regarding
leniency, they are allowed to imply that if the individual coop-
erates, he or she will get a lesser sentence.  As Drizen and Leo
discuss, the expectation that giving a confession will result in
release is a common explanation as to why juveniles end up
confessing. 
The prefrontal cortex is one of the last areas of the brain to
mature. It is responsible for cognition, abstract reasoning, deci-
sion making, and the modulation of appropriate behavior in
social situations.  It integrates information from all the senses
to direct thoughts and behaviors toward a specific goal.26 Juve-
niles are less able to reasonably evaluate consequences of their
behaviors compared to adults.  The prefrontal cortex needs to
be fully developed to make the types of complex decisions nec-
essary during an interrogation, such as whether to waive one’s
Miranda rights and/or give a confession—true, partially true, or
false. 
Kassin and Kiechel27 demonstrated in the laboratory the
false-confession phenomenon by convincing college under-
graduates they accidently caused a computer to crash by hitting
the Alt key on a keyboard during a computer-based task.
These false-confession studies were replicated by a number of
researchers, including Redlich and Goodman.28 They demon-
strated that age was correlated with signing a false statement
with concomitant negative consequences (i.e., spending an
additional ten hours retyping the material). There are prob-
lems with extrapolating this research to real-life interrogations.
First, in the criminal and juvenile contexts, punishment is
more serious than ten hours of data entry. Second, research
participants were convinced they accidently, rather than pur-
posely, committed the infraction.  As Redlich and Goodman
point out, the results of these studies replicate those involving
the suggestibility of child witnesses in that: (a) juveniles are
more suggestible than adults, (b) young children, particularly
those under the age of 14, understand legal concepts less well
than adults,29 and (c) leading and suggestive repetitive inter-
views lead to inaccurate and false reports. Juveniles are sub-
stantially more vulnerable than adults to police influence and
in giving false confessions.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUA-
TION AND SUBSEQUENT
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The Reid interrogation method
and its various offshoots are highly
effective and serve the purpose of
getting truly guilty individuals to
confess.  Unfortunately, a major
problem with these techniques is
that there are certain vulnerable
individuals who may confess not
because they committed the offense, but because they are
overly susceptible to giving in to these interrogation methods.
It is a proper role for a mental health professional to describe
the specific psychological characteristics of a defendant, how
those characteristics interact and are influenced during the
interrogation, and how they may influence the validity or reli-
ability of statements given to law enforcement compared to the
average person.
In alleged false- or coerced-confession cases, a mental
health professional needs to conduct a comprehensive clinical
and psychosocial interview with a special focus on obtaining
the defendant’s version of what transpired during the interro-
gation.  In addition, psychological tests are administered to
more objectively assess those psychological vulnerabilities
which have been known to be associated with a higher risk of
succumbing to police demands and/or providing false state-
ments.  Such evaluations usually include intelligence, person-
ality, and malingering tests.
One important test is the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale30
(GSS) to specifically measure interrogative suggestibility. Inter-
rogative suggestibility has been defined as the extent to which
an individual comes to accept messages or information com-
municated during formal questioning as true.31 Although not
administered as a test of memory, the GSS is presented to the
defendant as such.  The test involves the reading of a complex
narrative story containing 40 bits of factual information.  After
the story is read, the subject is asked to recall everything he or
she remembers about the story. Generally, after a 50-minute
delay, the defendant is again asked to recall the story’s details.
Then 20 standardized questions are asked about the story, 15
of which are designed to be leading or misleading.  A Yield 1
score is subsequently obtained. This is the number of times the
subject yields to the leading questions.  Regardless of perfor-
mance, the individual is firmly told he or she has made a num-
ber of errors and that it is necessary to go over each question
again and to be “more accurate.”  Then the 20 questions are
repeated.  A second yield score, Yield 2, is obtained.  A third
measure, Shift, is obtained, which is the number of times an
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individual shifts from one
response (right or wrong) to a dif-
ferent response.  A Total Sug-
gestibility Score is also calculated,
which is the sum of Yield 1 and
Shift.  The results of this test are
directly relevant to how sug-
gestible an individual is to police
interrogations—that is, how fre-
quently the defendant gives in to
leading questions and shifts to
different responses under pres-
sure. The GSS provides one piece
of data which may be relevant to addressing issues pertaining
to the validity or voluntariness of a confession.  Results from
the GSS become relevant only if law enforcement provides mis-
leading information to the suspect or pressures that suspect
into changing his or her response.  Research has shown that
Yield 1 is influenced by cognitive variables, while Yield 2 and
Shift are more impacted by personality variables.32
Gudjonsson33 summarizes the research regarding sug-
gestibility and juveniles. Children who are 12 years of age and
older, although no more likely to give in to leading questions
than adults, are more affected by negative feedback or inter-
rogative pressure to change their responses.  Younger children
are more suggestible than older children and tend to be not
only more susceptible to negative feedback and pressure but
also more likely to yield to leading questions, in comparison
with both older juveniles and adults.  This has implications as
to how juveniles are interrogated.34
Gudjonsson also developed the Gudjonsson Compliance
Scale (GCS) as a 20-item self-report measure to complement
the GSS.  Compliance differs from suggestibility because the
individual does not have to privately accept the premise pre-
sented by police officers as true.  On the test, the subject
responds True or False to each of 20 items (e.g., I give in eas-
ily when I am pressured).  There is a companion version of the
test to administer to those who know the subject well.  The
problem with the GCS is that there is no way to assess if the
respondent is presenting him or herself accurately or is pur-
posely or unconsciously minimizing or exaggerating compli-
ance.  This is not a problem for the GSS because it is relatively
immune from malingering.  For example, in a study by Baxter
and Bain,35 an experimental group was told before administer-
ing the test that their suggestibility was to be measured.  This
group was told to feign suggestibility.  Only the Yield 1 score
on the test was affected.
Psychological testimony should serve the purpose of edu-
cating the jury about risk factors within the individual and the
interrogation process itself that could increase the likelihood
of a false or involuntary confession.  It is not proper for the
expert to opine whether the confession was coerced, involun-
tary, false, likely false, or even true.  Testimony related to psy-
chological characteristics of a defendant in interaction with
interrogative tactics assists in determining the weight to be
given to the voluntariness or validity of a confession.  This type
of testimony has been accepted in many jurisdictions through-
out the country.  When testimony has not been allowed, it is
generally because the mental health expert had planned on
addressing the ultimate legal issue as to whether the defendant
gave a false or involuntary confession or because relevancy for
the particular case was not established. 
A defendant might be highly suggestible, the police might
have been overly coercive in their interrogation methods (it is
for the court to draw the line as to whether the police crossed
a legal threshold in their methods of extracting a Miranda
waiver or confession), or an interactive combination of the
two.  Yet, a suggestible defendant may have committed an
offense and nonetheless retracted a true confession.    Expert
testimony is designed to provide specialized knowledge to the
trier of fact so a determination can be made as to how much
weight to give to the confession or the effects of the interroga-
tion on the defendant, not to provide an opinion on the valid-
ity of the confession itself.  Testimony can also be provided as
to the effects of particular interrogation techniques on people
in general and on the defendant in particular and how those
procedures can produce false confessions.
It is problematic when the mental health professional places
undue and inappropriate weight on the GSS and other test
scores (such as IQ) to opine that the defendant was likely to
have given a false confession.  Rather, it is preferable to discuss
how such psychological factors increase the likelihood of a false
confession compared to the average person.  Testimony when
worded in relative terms (e.g., the person’s psychological func-
tioning compared to others, which heightens the risk of a false
confession) or in explanatory terms (e.g., if this person did not
do the crime, why he or she may have said they did so), provides
useful information to the trier of fact in deciding how much
weight to give to self-incriminating statements.  There is a
greater chance this testimony would be admitted because it is
specialized knowledge that assists the trier of fact and does not
invade the province of the jury.  Many clinicians blur the bound-
aries between their roles and that of the trier of fact.  When this
happens, such testimony is oftentimes not allowed at trial.
Some argue that the GSS should only be used in cases in
which a suspect erroneously believed he or she committed the
crime: a coerced-internalized false-confession scenario.  Fur-
ther, some suggest GSS is not relevant for the type of confes-
sion in which a suspect confesses due to pressure from police
or from others because these suspects know whether or not
they committed the crime, and their “autobiographical mem-
ory” was not impaired.36 This is a fallacy because the Shift
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score is much less influenced by memory processes than the
Yield score.  There is also a correlation between compliance
and suggestibility.  Finally, as with all test data, the results must
be interpreted by the totality of the circumstances for a partic-
ular defendant in the context of a specific case and its facts. 
RECENT RULINGS ON ADMISSIBILITY OF FALSE-CON-
FESSION, EXPERT TESTIMONY
Case law has been mixed regarding the admissibility of
expert testimony on false confessions in general or the use of
the GSS in particular.37 Several courts support the position that
such expert evidence both in juvenile and adult cases adds crit-
ical evidence to the jury’s determination of whether a confes-
sion might be false. In a seminal case, nearly two decades ago,
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hall38 found that
although a trial court may exclude “expert testimony that may
in some way overlap with matters within the jury’s experi-
ence,”39 the court’s determination that the sociological expert’s
“testimony would add nothing to what the jury would know
from common experience”40 was an insufficient basis to pre-
vent the jury from considering valid social science evidence.41
Two other federal circuits have issued decisions similar to
Hall,42 as have the Federal District Court of New Mexico43 and
nine states: California,44 Colorado,45 Florida,46 Indiana,47 Ken-
tucky,48 Nebraska,49 New York,50 North Carolina,51 and Utah.52
However, courts have not unequivocally allowed expert tes-
timony, with the majority of exclusions based on the helpful-
ness of the expert testimony to the
trier of fact. In People v. Bennet,53
for example, a trial court refused
to allow expert testimony (by this
author) concerning a defendant’s
suggestibility because the trial
court decided (and the Illinois
Appellate Court upheld) that
interrogative suggestibility “was
not beyond the common knowl-
edge of lay persons and would not
aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusions.”54 Furthermore,
the defendant’s suggestibility was not tied to a diagnosed men-
tal illness.55 Similarly, 12 other states—Alaska,56 Arkansas,57
Georgia,58 Iowa,59 Kansas,60 Louisiana,61 Maine,62 Massachu-
setts,63 Michigan,64 Minnesota,65 Missouri,66 and New
Jersey67—three of the federal circuits,68 the Federal District
Court in Massachusetts,69 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces70 have rejected expert testimony as unreliable or
usurping the function of the jury. Nevertheless, as suggested
elsewhere in this issue, the vast majority of commentators who
have examined the issue believe trial courts “should be open to
hearing from an expert on police interrogations of juveniles as
they consider the police tactics used and the ultimate volun-
tariness of the confession, and the same is true for adults.”71
As might be anticipated in light of the overall mixed recep-
tivity by courts to expert evidence in general regarding confes-
“[E]xpert 
evidence... 
adds critical
evidence [about]
whether a 
confession might 
be false.”
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sions, courts’ allowances/exclu-
sions of testimony based on the
GSS have been similarly mixed.
In Misskelley v. State,72 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas upheld the trial court’s
ruling to disallow a clinical psy-
chologist to testify based on the
GSS.73 The psychologist was
allowed to testify that the juvenile
defendant was “quite suggestible,” however.74 Thus, the trial
court did allow the psychologist and another expert, a sociol-
ogist, to offer their expert opinions about the voluntariness of
the defendant’s confession.75 Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Soares,76 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts upheld a motion
judge’s decision not to accord any weight to a psychologist’s
testimony regarding the defendant’s confession as part of the
defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to police.77 The
psychologist appeared unaware of the purpose of the GSS, stat-
ing that the GSS results would not apply to a custodial situa-
tion if “the interrogation was devoid of physical force” or
shouting.78
The GSS was judged to meet Daubert79 and Frye80 standards
of admissibility in United States v. Raposo81 and People v. Nel-
son.82 In Raposo, the Federal District Court rejected the gov-
ernment’s request to exclude expert testimony on false confes-
sions and the GSS83 because it was deemed relevant to the fac-
tual question of both the falsity and the voluntariness of the
confession.84 In Nelson, the Illinois Supreme Court noted the
trial court found the GSS was generally accepted in the scien-
tific community, thus meeting the Frye test for admissibility.85
Finally, a reoccurring issue courts have focused on is the fit
of the expert testimony to the case facts. In United States v. Deu-
man,86 a false-confession expert’s testimony was ruled inad-
missible. The problem was not that the expert’s theories were
problematic as a general matter; rather, they were deemed
“unreliable and irrelevant” to the specific facts at issue in the
case.87 Coupled with the risk that the expert’s testimony of the
possibility of a coerced confession would be especially persua-
sive to the jury,88 the proffered testimony was excluded.  In its
analysis, the court distinguished the proffered testimony in
this case from cases where the expert testimony is intended to
assist the fact finder in understanding how the defendant’s psy-
chology makes him or her especially susceptible to making a
false confession.89 Similar to Deuman, an Oregon trial court
disallowed GSS testimony not because the judge felt that the
GSS was a poor test but because the court believed “it’s a com-
ment on the evidence, it’s a comment on the voluntariness.”90
However, the Oregon Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court and allowed the testimony, stating, “It would have been
probative, relevant, and helpful to the trier of fact.”91
RECOMMENDATIONS
Law enforcement officers in the United States use the Reid
technique or similar interrogation practices to get people
whom they believe are guilty of a crime to confess.  It is an
effective method to get guilty people to confess to crimes, in
that half of criminal cases involve a confession.92 Whether it is
fair to use deceit and psychologically coercive procedures to
extract confessions is both a societal and moral issue. Public
safety concerns as well as punishment for those who do not
uphold the law generally trump, in many peoples’ minds, con-
cerns for how confessions are obtained, as long as the interro-
gation does not involve physical coercion or extreme depriva-
tion.
The problem is that there are certain vulnerable people who
may confess to a crime they did not commit because of these
very interrogation tactics designed to get guilty people to con-
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“[A] reoccurring
issue courts have
focused on is the
fit of the expert
testimony to the
case facts.”
fess.  Such vulnerabilities include low intelligence, anxiety,
memory problems, acquiescence, suggestibility, compliance,
and sleep deprivation. Juveniles and young adults are particu-
larly susceptible to false confessions.  Although the PEACE
model for investigative interviews seems to rarely produce
false confessions, it is not yet known whether the guilty con-
fess when the PEACE model is used at the same rate as when
the Reid technique is used.
Mental health testimony about an individual’s vulnerability
to interrogation tactics that might produce a false or partially
false confession can provide the trier of fact with important
information to assist in deciding how much weight should be
given to the confession. The testimony must consist of spe-
cialized knowledge and be relevant to how the confession was
ultimately obtained.
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There are a number of legal decisions in which the courtmust decide whether juveniles can be rehabilitated. Suchdecisions include juvenile adjudication/placement, waiver,
and reverse waiver.1 The criterion used by courts to consider
rehabilitation amenability is typically phrased in a way similar
to that described under Pennsylvania state law.2 In deciding
whether a child may be decertified (reverse waived from crimi-
nal to juvenile court), the court can consider
whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervi-
sion, or rehabilitation as a juvenile. The court may con-
sider the following in determining treatment, supervi-
sion, or rehabilitation amenability: (a) age, (b) mental
capacity, (c) maturity, (d) degree of criminal sophistica-
tion, (e) previous records, (f) nature and extent of any
prior delinquent history, including the success or failure
of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to reha-
bilitate, (g) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior
to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction, (h)
probation or institutional reports, (i) any other relevant
factors, and (j) whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the child is not committable to an institution
for the mentally retarded or mentally ill.3
Empathy for the victims of the defendant’s offenses, and
acceptance of responsibility for such offenses, may be consid-
ered by mental health and justice professionals working with
post-adjudicated youth. But rendering an expert opinion that
describes the youth’s capacity for empathy or acceptance of
responsibility, when that opinion is based in part on questions
concerning the alleged offense, places the evaluating expert in
an awkward position. To what extent can denial of culpability
be used to infer limited empathy and acceptance of responsibil-
ity? How does the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation factor into this consideration?
Some courts have addressed these questions, at least in part.
In a recent Pennsylvania decertification case,4 the defendant,
facing potential adjudication in criminal court, was 11 years old
when charged with shooting and killing his stepmother and her
unborn child. The trial court denied a defense motion to decer-
tify the case to the juvenile division, and defense counsel
appealed. 
In the appeal, defense contended that the trial court com-
mitted an error of law in applying a provision of the decertifi-
cation statute5 in a manner that infringed upon the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In particular,
the psychiatrist retained by the Commonwealth testified that
the youth avoided talking about the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing and the factual allegations. The psychiatrist
added that such avoidance of taking responsibility complicated
rehabilitation, as taking responsibility is a necessary precursor
to effective rehabilitation. Thus, he concluded, Jordan Brown
could not be rehabilitated. 
The trial court decided that the defendant could not be reha-
bilitated by the age of 21, citing the expert’s reasoning that the
defendant would not take responsibility for his actions—and
thus concluding that rehabilitation was unlikely to be success-
ful. On appeal, however, the appellate court held that the Fifth
Amendment applies in decertification proceedings. The appel-
late court vacated the trial court’s order, remanding the case for
a new decertification hearing. In the subsequent trial court
hearing, without the evidence offered initially by the Common-
wealth’s expert, the court concluded that Jordan Brown should
be decertified. 
This Pennsylvania case offers some precedent for legal pro-
ceedings in which a juvenile defendant’s rehabilitation
amenability is at issue. This article will address two questions:
(1) To what extent does the Fifth Amendment provide protec-
tion from compelled testimony at transfer hearings? and (2)
What does the relevant behavioral science evidence suggest
concerning the appraisal of a defendant’s capacity for empathy
and acceptance of responsibility—and to what extent is such an
appraisal limited when a mental health expert cannot question
the defendant about his/her role in the alleged offense?
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FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF JUVENILES 
FROM COMPELLED TESTIMONY AT TRANSFER HEARINGS
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court established that
the Fifth Amendment is broadly applicable to juvenile transfer
hearings.6 Since that time, some states have more specifically
addressed the application of the Fifth Amendment in juvenile
transfer hearings with respect to compelled testimony in such
hearings. This section will describe jurisdictions in which (a)
compelled, self-incriminating testimony is disallowed; (b) such
testimony is permitted; and (c) relevant law does not clearly
support either (a) or (b). Whenever possible, we focus particu-
larly on the use of such testimony to the question of amenabil-
ity to rehabilitation rather than other questions (e.g., risk of
future offending) that often arise in transfer proceedings.
JURISDICTIONS DISALLOWING COMPELLED SELF-
INCRIMINATING TESTIMONY
Alaska. In R.H. v. State7 the court compelled the juvenile to
submit to a psychiatric evaluation and substance abuse screen-
ing. Therein, the court sought to avoid the risk of self-incrimi-
nation by allowing the defendant’s attorney to be present, to
screen the report first, and to limit the use of the report beyond
the waiver hearing. During the stage of the transfer hearing
devoted to determining the juvenile’s treatment amenability, the
State presented testimony from three experts who had exam-
ined the defendant “(t)o establish the probable cause of R.H.’s
delinquent behavior and the adequacy of existing facilities to
provide treatment to R.H. . . .”8 However, the juvenile did not
introduce psychiatric evidence on his own behalf.
On appeal, the defendant claimed infringement on his right
to be free from self-incrimination. The State argued that R.H.
was protected because “the court restricted the use of the eval-
uations to the determination of R.H.’s amenability to treatment
and precluded their use in subsequent phases of his case. . . .”9
In its ruling, the court noted that “the stakes involved in such
proceedings are high”10 and that the transfer hearing is an
adversarial process. The court concluded that this compelled
evaluation helped the state to incriminate the defendant, citing
Estelle v. Smith as authority that “the fifth amendment privilege
is not confined to directly inculpatory statements or to any par-
ticular type of proceeding.”11 The court explained that the pros-
ecution’s report helped the court decide to prosecute R.H. as an
adult—and, as a result, he faced much more serious punish-
ment.12 However, the court also noted that had the juvenile pre-
sented psychiatric evidence on his own behalf, this may constitute
a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.13 Ultimately, the court
held that “the erroneously
admitted evidence did not have
an appreciable effect on the
court’s ultimate decision to waive
jurisdiction,”14 vacating the orig-
inal order and remanding the
case for reconsideration.
Arizona. In one Arizona case
in which a juvenile was charged
with first-degree murder, the
state requested a mental health
evaluation. The defense opposed
this request because any incriminating statements could be
used in both the transfer hearing and in any subsequent pro-
ceedings (including on the issue of guilt).15 The court ordered
the examination but stated that “the decision whether to sub-
mit to [the evaluation] was up to the appellant. No limitation
as ordered on the use of the results of the examination.”16 Addi-
tionally, the court made clear that it intended to use the juve-
nile’s decision regarding participation in the evaluation when
determining his treatment amenability.17 The appellate court
found the juvenile’s refusal formed a foundation for the lower
court’s determination of non-amenability, adding that this issue
could be avoided by “placing appropriate limitations on the use
of appellant’s statements in the court’s order granting the
request for a mental examination.”18 However, by not limiting
the use of the evaluation and then “penalizing the appellant for
refusing to cooperate,”19 the process violated the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment rights.20
California. In Ramona R. v. Superior Court,21 the California
Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a juvenile defendant,
charged with murder, had been held by the trial court as “unfit
to be tried in juvenile court” due to the “gravity of her offense”
and low treatment amenability.22 After granting appeal, the
Supreme Court of California considered whether section 707(c)
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code was unconsti-
tutional.23 The issue was that it appeared to compel a minor to
choose between the due-process right to testify and privilege
against self-incrimination.24
In its decision, the Supreme Court of California observed
that use immunities are important to protect against self-
incrimination and that “testimony a minor gives at a fitness
hearing or statements he makes to his probation officer may not
be used against him at a subsequent trial of the offense.”25
According to the court, the defendant should have had “protec-
tion against the use at trial of any statements she may make to
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her probation officer or to the
court at her fitness hearing.”26
Noting that transfer to criminal
court is “the worst punishment
the juvenile system is empow-
ered to inflict,” the court
described this as a cruel
“trilemma” in which the defen-
dant was forced to choose
between (1) making a case for
herself, but potentially having
those statements used against
her; (2) risking that invoking the
Fifth Amendment would be seen
as an indication that there are no reasons the juvenile should
not be tried in criminal court; and (3) giving altogether false
testimony.27
The court concluded that such a cruel “trilemma” was not an
appropriate set of choices.28 Because the court found that the
immunity required by California law was violated, the question
of whether it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proving
fitness for juvenile court treatment on the minor was not
addressed.29
Colorado. In People in Interest of A.D.G., the Colorado Court
of Appeals reviewed a case in which a juvenile had been
charged with manslaughter and use of a weapon.30 In most of
the cases reviewed in this article, transfer appeals are filed by
the defense after a juvenile has been transferred to criminal
court. In this case, however, the lower court denied the prose-
cution’s motion to transfer the case to criminal court, retaining
the defendant in juvenile court.31 Thus, it was the prosecution’s
appeal that was addressed in People in Interest of A.D.G.32
In the original case, the prosecution sought a psychological
evaluation of the juvenile when it requested the case be trans-
ferred to criminal court.33 The juvenile court “concluded that it
could not order a psychological examination over the juvenile’s
objection”34 and that a juvenile could not be “compelled to sub-
mit to an evaluation because of his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.”35 On review, the Colorado Court of
Appeals agreed, holding that a juvenile cannot be compelled to
participate in an evaluation under these circumstances.36
Concluding that the trial court was correct in its decision not
to compel the evaluation, the appellate court reasoned that the
Fifth Amendment clearly applies to transfer hearings because
(1) they are “‘plainly adverse’”37 to the juvenile, and (2) the
juvenile risks loss of rehabilitation and is instead subject to
adult penalties.38 Finally, the court held that the juvenile’s
refusal to be examined by a psychologist could not be consid-
ered as part of a transfer decision because a “defendant may not
be penalized for the exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent.”39
People in Interest of A.D.G., however, was later distinguished
by People in Interest of C.Y.40 In this case, the magistrate ordered
a psychosexual evaluation as part of a risk management plan
after C.Y. was found incompetent to stand trial and could not
be restored.41 The court held that the magistrate’s order did not
violate C.Y.’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
reasoning that the case did not involve a transfer hearing but
instead concerned “the ‘neutral’ issue of competency.”42 Fur-
ther, the court concluded that any statements made during the
evaluation would be obtained during treatment related to
incompetency, and the juvenile would receive statutory immu-
nity.43
Kansas. In State v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Kansas con-
sidered whether consent to a psychological evaluation pursuant
to a transfer hearing was objectionable when Miranda rights
had not been read beforehand.44 In the original trial, the juve-
nile defendant had been convicted of first-degree felony murder
and related offenses.45 Therein, the prosecution had not tried to
admit self-incriminating statements at trial—rather, such state-
ments were used only as part of the evaluation.46 The trial court
insisted that it would not consider any statements about the
alleged offense that may establish guilt but would rather use
other information in the report.47 Upon conviction, the juvenile
defendant appealed on a number of grounds, including the cir-
cumstances surrounding the court-ordered psychological eval-
uation.48
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a juve-
nile’s declining to participate in the court-ordered evaluation
may not be admitted as evidence against the juvenile.49 Under
these circumstances, in Kansas, there appears to be two levels
of protection against compelled self-incriminating statements:
they are not admissible on the issue of guilt, and the defendant
may decline participation in a court-ordered evaluation on Fifth
Amendment grounds without risking adverse consequences.
Massachusetts. In Commonwealth v. Wayne W., the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed a case wherein two
juvenile defendants were transferred to criminal court.50 The
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defendants appealed on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s exclu-
sion of their expert psychiatric witnesses, who would have tes-
tified regarding their “amenability to rehabilitation within the
juvenile justice system.”51 The judge excluded the experts,
however, because the juveniles had refused to participate in an
evaluation with the prosecution’s psychiatric expert.52 They
asserted that being evaluated by the prosecution’s expert would
violate their right against self-incrimination.53
Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that Fifth Amendment protection applies in transfer hearings
and related proceedings, it was careful to limit the scope of that
protection.54 The court stated that when defendants “voluntar-
ily choose to offer expert psychiatric evidence, [they] can be
ordered to participate in an examination by a Commonwealth
expert.”55 The court also noted that “a defendant who speaks
on his own behalf thereby gives up his privilege of silence and
may be compelled to respond to questions posed by the State on
matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his own tes-
timony.”56 Thus, the court upheld the lower court’s transfer
decision but explained that its ruling could have been different
had the juveniles not sought to introduce their own expert psy-
chiatric testimony.57
Minnesota. The Minnesota appellate court has held that, for
purposes of certification, a “juvenile is presumed guilty of the
alleged offenses.”58 For presumptive-certification proceedings,
the State must demonstrate that the juvenile “was 16 or 17
years old at the time of the offense” and that “the alleged
offense carries a presumptive prison sentence.”59 At that point,
the juvenile may rebut the certification by demonstrating that
the juvenile system would better serve public safety if the case
were not transferred. In the case In re Welfare of S.J.T., defense
contended that (1) “Minnesota certification procedure violates
the Fifth Amendment by requiring the juvenile to rebut a pre-
sumption of certification,” and (2) “the Fifth Amendment pre-
cludes the district court from compelling the juvenile to submit
certain information to the state.”60 The appellant had retained
his own expert but refused to meet with the state’s expert.61
Although he met with a probation officer conducting the certi-
fication study and agreed to provide access to medical records,
the juvenile then revoked this release of information.62
On review, the appellate court found that although certifica-
tion proceedings are “not a dispositional procedure,” the Fifth
Amendment “applies to all proceedings.”63 The court also held
that although the presumptive certification proceedings offer
the juvenile the opportunity to
testify and rebut, “he is not
required to do so”64—therefore,
the statute does not compel him
to testify and thus violate the
Fifth Amendment. The appel-
lant had argued that his Fifth
Amendment rights were vio-
lated when he was compelled to
“produce certain records . . .
without protection to the defen-
dant for any incriminating
statements that those records
may contain.”65 However, the
court concluded that because the records were compelled, “the
information provided is therefore immune from use in appel-
lant’s criminal proceeding.”66 The appellate court ultimately
concluded that the Fifth Amendment does apply to certification
and further observed that applicable state statutes protect
against the use of any evidence or source of evidence used in a
certification study from use in later trials.67
Nevada. The Supreme Court of Nevada heard consolidated
appeals from two juveniles certified as adults.68 In the first case,
William M. was charged with “conspiracy to commit robbery,
burglary while in possession of a firearm, and robbery with the
use of a deadly weapon.”69 The State sought to have him certi-
fied as an adult, submitting the court psychologists’ evaluation
and a certification report written by the juvenile’s probation
officer, both detailing the defendant’s alcohol abuse.70 During
the certification hearing, defense counsel explained that
although there was evidence regarding William’s substance
abuse, William was “unable to rebut the presumption of adult
certification by connecting his substance abuse problem to any
actions in the alleged robbery, as he denied being involved in
the incident.”71 The trial court responded that “even though
William had clearly established an alcohol abuse problem, he
had not established a direct nexus between his alcohol abuse
and the alleged conduct,” thus certifying him to criminal
court.72
In the second case, the State again sought to transfer a juve-
nile with robbery and firearms charges to criminal court.73 The
psychological evaluation in the second case described sub-
stance abuse as well as behavioral and emotional problems, but
the juvenile again denied participation in the offense.74 The trial
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of protection.
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court found that because he could
not establish “a nexus between
his substance abuse or his emo-
tional and behavioral issues and
the park robbery, as he denies any
involvement in the robbery,”75 the
court certified him to criminal
court. 
In the consolidated appeal, the
defense argued that requiring
juveniles to admit guilt “to rebut
the presumption of adult certification” while “failing to prohibit
the admission of their incriminating statement in subsequent
guilt-determination proceedings”76 violated their Fifth Amend-
ment rights. The appellate court agreed, holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “applies to
inculpatory statements made in juvenile proceedings.”77 The
court reasoned that requiring juveniles to “establish a direct
nexus” between their problems and the criminal conduct forces
them to provide inculpatory evidence to rebut the certification
presumption.78 Because there was no prohibition against using
these statements in subsequent proceedings, the appellate court
held that “Nevada’s presumption certification provisions . . .
violate the Fifth Amendment and therefore are unconstitu-
tional.”79
New Mexico. In a recent New Mexico case, a juvenile
(Christopher P.) was charged with two counts of first-degree
murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.80 At a
second (amenability) stage of the transfer hearing, the chil-
dren’s court judge ordered the defendant to submit to a mental
health evaluation to help determine his rehabilitation amenabil-
ity.81 Although the juvenile’s counsel objected, the court
“ordered the child to discuss the alleged delinquent acts with
the psychologist conducting the evaluation”82 and also ordered
that the information about the alleged offenses could be used
only for the amenability portion of the transfer hearing.83 The
youth was transferred to criminal court and appealed on
numerous grounds, including Fifth Amendment infringement
“when the children’s court ordered him to discuss the alleged
crimes during the psychological evaluation.”84
On review, the Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the
transfer, overriding the trial and appellate courts.85 The court
found that Fifth Amendment rights of the child were violated
when he was made to discuss the charges, though the court also
held that ordering a mental health evaluation was not beyond
the authority of the trial court.86
Oklahoma. In J.T.P. v. State, a juvenile was arrested on mur-
der charges and a petition was filed for transfer to criminal
court.87 After his arrest, the juvenile was questioned, with his
father present for some of the questioning.88 However, it could
not be determined whether the father knew his son was in cus-
tody or whether the juvenile ever attempted to assert or waive
his constitutional rights.89 The juvenile was subsequently trans-
ferred to Arkansas for a polygraph test; the father provided per-
mission, and the juvenile was informed of his Miranda rights.90
The polygraph was administered by a police captain, who was
alone in the room with the juvenile, and the juvenile confessed
to his part in the murder after the polygraph was adminis-
tered.91 In the trial, the juvenile was transferred to criminal
court.92
On appeal, the defense contended that this confession was in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.93 The appellate court
agreed and further held that the juvenile court must exclude cer-
tification evidence involving “statements of a child, obtained in
violation of constitutional or statutory rights” that are inadmis-
sible in delinquency or criminal proceedings.94 In the case at
hand, the court determined that the statement resulting from the
interrogation should not be admitted.95 Thereafter, the court saw
insufficient evidence that the juvenile could not be rehabilitated
(although those two were not necessarily linked).96
JURISDICTIONS ALLOWING COMPELLED SELF-
INCRIMINATING TESTIMONY
Alabama. The 14-year-old juvenile in Lippold v. State was
charged with murder, but because of his age, the circuit court
heard a motion for transfer to juvenile court.97 This motion was
unsuccessful, and the defendant was tried and convicted in
adult criminal court.98 In the transfer hearing, the prosecution
presented a psychologist’s testimony regarding a court-ordered
evaluation.99 Although the psychologist provided notification
to the juvenile, he was not sure whether the defendant fully
understood the potential implications.100 There was no coun-
selor or parent present, and the defendant described facts relat-
ing to the offense.101 Based largely on the evaluation, the defen-
dant was tried in the circuit court as an adult.102
On review of this decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Alabama observed that “[h]ad the State of Alabama endeavored
to use the statement made to Dr. Bitgood as substantive evi-
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dence . . . we would not hesitate to reverse and remand this
cause for a new trial.”103 However, the State “did not use Lip-
pold’s inculpatory statements to Dr. Bitgood as evidence at
trial.”104 Instead, they were used only in the transfer hearing,
and the appellate court determined that this situation had been
“properly handled by the Circuit Court.”105
Arkansas. In a 2004 case, a 14-year-old juvenile charged
with murder was considered for reverse transfer into juvenile
court.106 Testimony was provided from multiple sources,
including his paternal grandmother, a DHS supervisor, a social
worker, a teacher from juvenile detention, a Youth Services
Center facility director, a child and adolescent psychiatrist
(who testified about the defendant’s prior hospitalizations), a
Division of Youth Services case manager, and an Arkansas Pub-
lic Defender Commission investigator (who had met with the
juvenile).107 The prosecution also proffered testimony from a
state police special agent and a mental health professional who
had evaluated the defendant for competence to stand trial.108
Appealing the decision to try the juvenile defendant in crim-
inal court, defense argued that the defendant’s Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination was violated because he
“was forced to incriminate himself at a transfer hearing.”109 The
prosecution contended—and the Supreme Court of Arkansas
agreed—that the statute did not compel the juvenile to testify
and that he did not actually “testify” at the hearing.110 By this
line of reasoning, therefore, the Fifth Amendment does not
seem to prevent Arkansas prosecution from presenting inculpa-
tory evaluation evidence at a transfer hearing.
Louisiana. In State in the Interest of Bruno, the juvenile
defendant was charged with second-degree murder, and the
State sought transfer to criminal court.111 Pursuant to that
motion, the prosecution sought to have the juvenile submit to
a “psychiatric and psychological examination . . . for the pur-
pose of evaluating the child’s ‘amenability’ to the juvenile sys-
tem.”112 Although defense objected, the trial court held that the
applicable state statute did “not prevent a judge from ordering
a child in a juvenile transfer proceeding to undergo a psycho-
logical evaluation.”113 As the court explained, a juvenile trans-
fer requires “a full-blown hearing at which the child has a right
to an attorney, and which involves the presentation of evidence
by both the child and the state.”114
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that a
juvenile undergoing such an evaluation is entitled to Fifth
Amendment protections.115 In
this case, though, the court
explained that the evaluation
was not used to determine guilt
but rather to simply address the
question of amenability to
treatment.116 As a result, “it
does not violate the child’s
right not to be compelled to
give evidence against him-
self.”117 The court also noted,
however, that “no statements,
either inculpatory or exculpa-
tory, made to the psychologist
or psychiatrist during the examination, would be admissible at
the trial on the merits of the child’s guilt or innocence.”118
Michigan. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Michigan granted
an appeal after a juvenile, charged with possession and delivery
of a substance containing cocaine and related charges, was
waived for trial in adult criminal court.119 In the hearing, the
defendant offered character testimony and his own psycholo-
gist.120 However, the juvenile was waived following testimony
from the probate court psychologist and the arresting police
officers.121 The juvenile appealed this transfer and the appellate
court reversed, holding that “the constitutional rights applica-
ble in criminal proceedings extended to . . . the dispositional
phase of a waiver hearing.”122 The Michigan Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court, however, holding that the consti-
tutional rights did not extend to the dispositional phase of a
wavier hearing because the best interests of the juveniles and
the public are taken under consideration.123
Texas. In K.W.M. v. State, the 14th District Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas reviewed a case wherein a juvenile, charged
with aggravated robbery at age 16, appealed his discretionary
transfer to criminal court.124 In the state’s petition for transfer,
the prosecution submitted a written confession and diagnostic
report/evaluation as evidence.125 Although the defense objected
to these documents’ admission, the court overruled the objec-
tion, and the case was ultimately transferred to the adult sys-
tem.126
The juvenile appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the psycho-
logical report and evaluation—neither requested nor consented
to by him or his attorney—should not have been admitted.127
The Michigan
Supreme Court
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The court stated that the Texas
Code requires that “prior to
the hearing, the juvenile court
shall order and obtain a com-
plete diagnostic study, social
evaluation, and full investiga-
tion of the child, his circum-
stances, and the circumstances
of the alleged offense.”128 Defense countered that this violates
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.129 The
Court of Civil Appeals, however, described the transfer hearing
as “not an adjudication of the child’s guilt or innocence” and
concluded, therefore, that Fifth Amendment rights did not
apply.130 Interestingly, the court also noted that the code “does
not require the court to order the child to discuss his or her
involvement in the alleged crime with the examiner but merely
‘the circumstances of the alleged offense.’”131 Therefore, a juve-
nile is not coerced to make self-incriminating statements, and
his “Fifth Amendment rights are in no way jeopardized” (even
if they did apply).132
Washington. The juvenile in In re Hegney was charged with
felony murder, tried as an adult, and convicted.133 He appealed
the decision, but the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division
2, affirmed the decision.134 The defense filed a personal
restraint petition, arguing that Washington’s juvenile declina-
tion procedure (i.e., a court declining to transfer a juvenile pre-
sumptively tried as an adult to juvenile court) violated his Fifth
Amendment rights.135 The defense contended that the proce-
dure created a circumstance in which “evidence was admitted
at the decline hearing, and used against Mr. Hegney, that later
the same court determined to be inadmissible.”136 The appellate
court held, however, that a “decline hearing is not prosecutor-
ial in nature,” and guilt is not in question.137 They further stated
that “(t)he procedure itself cannot lead to a juvenile’s loss of lib-
erty” and that “even improperly obtained statements by the
police are admissible at a decline hearing, even though they
would not be admissible at a substantive trial.”138
JURISDICTIONS NEITHER ALLOWING NOR DISALLOW-
ING COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATING TESTIMONY
West Virginia. In State v. George Anthony W., two juveniles
were taken into custody as suspects in a murder, were ques-
tioned separately, and confessed.139 At the transfer hearing, the
juveniles moved to suppress the confessions and evidence, but
the court denied this motion and granted the state’s petition to
transfer the case to criminal court.140 The juveniles appealed,
arguing that the confession had been obtained in violation of
West Virginia law because of the “failure of the authorities to
present them to a judge or other appropriate party for a deten-
tion hearing prior to obtaining the statements.”141 The relevant
statute indicates that “[a] child in custody must immediately be
taken before a referee or judge of the circuit court and in no
event shall a delay exceed the next succeeding judicial 
day. . . .”142 In an earlier case, the court established that delay-
ing that appearance to obtain a confession violates this code.143
The appellate court, applying this “Ellsworth J.R. test,” found
that the appellants were held in custody “without being pre-
sented before a judicial officer.”144 The court further concluded
that the delay’s purpose was to obtain a confession and accord-
ingly held the confessions to be invalid. Because the transfer
decision was based on the invalid confessions, the transfer deci-
sion was reversed and remanded by the appellate court.145 This
decision neither clearly affirmed nor rejected the role of the
Fifth Amendment in juvenile transfer hearings; although the
trial court’s decision was reversed because of its use of an
“invalid confession,” the confession was invalid under the
Ellsworth J.R. timeliness test, not on Fifth Amendment
grounds.
EMPATHY, ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY, 
REHABILITATION AMENABILITY, AND REOFFENSE RISK 
Based on the above review, it appears that courts are divided
on whether the Fifth Amendment protects juveniles from com-
pelled confession during pre-adjudicative transfer hearings.
Some courts apply those confessions, or lack thereof, to inform
the question of whether the youth displays empathy for others
(including potential victims) and accepts responsibility for
what he or she has (allegedly) done. Courts favoring such com-
pelled confession suggest that the confession indicates empathy
and acceptance of responsibility. Those courts further assume
that juveniles who, by admission or confession, display empa-
thy and accept responsibility for the alleged offense will be
more amenable to rehabilitation efforts in the juvenile system. 
But how accurate is this suggestion? What does the relevant
behavioral science research indicate about the relationship
between empathy for victims, acceptance of responsibility, and
juvenile offending? More specifically, how do relevant evidence
and contemporary best practices suggest that risk and needs be
assessed in juveniles? Finally, and most specifically, what are
the roles of empathy and acceptance of responsibility in assess-
ing reoffense risk and risk-relevant needs—and does such
assessment require a discussion of the alleged offense? We focus
on these questions in this section. 
To facilitate this discussion, we will consider empathy and
acceptance of responsibility (AR) in the broader context of the
leading contemporary model describing risk and needs: the
Courts are 
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transfer stage.
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Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model.146 While empathy/AR
can influence the decision about the presence of some risk fac-
tors related to juvenile offending, there are other factors that
describe needs and affect risk as well.  
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EMPATHY, ACCEPTANCE OF
RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUVENILE OFFENDING
Normative development of empathy into adulthood has
been shown to relate to prosocial behavior.147 Conversely,
research has established a negative relationship between (1)
empathy and (2) aggression and antisocial behavior.148 One
meta-analysis found the empathetic/sympathetic index as mea-
sured by self-report questionnaires to be negatively related to
aggression and antisocial behavior.149 It should be noted, how-
ever, that only one study analyzed in this meta-analysis specifi-
cally involved criminal offending.150 Cohen and Strayer found
empathy was significantly lower in conduct-disordered youth
relative to a comparison group when participants viewed video-
taped vignettes.151 In addition, lower levels of empathy have
been related to an increased risk for engaging in interpersonal
violence and aggression.152 Exhibiting deficits in empathy may
fit in the broader context of developmentally delayed moral
judgment. A meta-analysis of 50 studies showed a lower stage
of moral judgment for juvenile delinquents.153 In addition,
lower levels of empathy in juveniles have been associated with
a lack of “moral judgment maturity” and self-serving cognitive
distortions.154
Empathy has commonly been divided into affective and cog-
nitive components. The affective component is the concordant
emotional response (i.e., sharing of emotional state) when
observing another’s emotional response.155 For example, affec-
tive empathy would include the capacity to feel sad when
observing someone else who is obviously sad. The cognitive
component involves understanding another’s emotional
state.156 Cognitive empathy, therefore, involves the capacity to
understand that another person who is obviously sad is feeling
that way—and to accurately label
this emotion as sadness. In a
meta-analysis of studies regarding
cognitive and affective empathy of
offending, low cognitive empathy
was strongly related to offending,
while low affective empathy was
more weakly related.157 In the
same study, the negative relation-
ship between empathy and
offending was stronger with violent offenders compared with
sexual offenders, meaning that violent offenders showed more
empathy deficits than did sexual offenders. Also, the relation-
ship between empathy and offending was stronger in adoles-
cents than in adults in this meta-analysis. Notably, however,
there was no relationship between empathy and offending after
taking into account socio-economic status and intelligence. In
other words, lower levels of empathy were more likely to be
seen in individuals of lower SES and more limited intellectual
functioning—and it might be that it was lower SES and lower
intelligence rather than empathy that were causally related to
offending. 
Additionally, in a group of juvenile sexual offenders, emo-
tional empathy was found to have a negative relationship with
non-sexual offenses. Within this same group of juveniles,
researchers concluded emotional empathy plays a role and
influences the relationship between offending and other factors.
For example, emotional empathy was found to moderate the
relationship between hostile masculinity and offending.158 It
seems clear empathy and offending cannot be viewed in isola-
tion but rather considered within the broader context of poten-
tially related factors.
Acceptance of responsibility has not been empirically stud-
ied in the same depth as empathy regarding its relationship to
aggression and offending. There is some research, however, on
how apologizing may relate to a reduction in future offending
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(the relationship between accep-
tance of responsibility and
apologies is discussed in the fol-
lowing section). In one study
conducted in New Zealand,
offending youths who did not
apologize were found to be three
times more likely to recidivate
than those who did.159 An apol-
ogy may contain a genuine ele-
ment of remorse or regret,160 but
it is certainly a formal expression of such. Another study exam-
ined the relationship between acceptance of responsibility and
engagement with the treatment process.161 The investigators
found that youths who accepted responsibility for their behav-
ior and thought there was a good reason for their placement
scored high on such scales as readiness to change and engage-
ment in treatment.162 In contrast, those who shifted responsi-
bility to others and felt there was not a good reason for the
placement scored lowest on the measures.163
Lack of remorse (e.g., feeling bad or guilty) can be viewed as
a component of “callous/unemotional (CU) traits,”164 which
helps to explain the lack of both empathy and acceptance of
responsibility. CU traits help distinguish adolescents with a
more consistent pattern of antisocial and delinquent behavior.165
The presence of CU traits in juveniles has been related to past
violent offenses in a group of juvenile offenders.166 Those who
exhibit CU traits have been shown to have a greater focus on the
positive aspects of aggression while having less focus on nega-
tive aspects of such aggression.167 Empathy was not directly
related to the propensity for violent behavior in adolescents.
SUPPORT FOR INFLUENCE OF EMPATHY AND ACCEP-
TANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN PRACTICE LITERATURE
There is some research support, discussed previously, for
the relationship between empathy and aggression. The pres-
ence of empathy has been viewed as a protective factor, while
the lack of empathy has been regarded as a risk factor. Some
have suggested that empathy inhibits aggression, as more
empathic individuals have the ability to view situations from
different perspectives.168 Aggressors may vicariously experi-
ence another’s distressed reaction, which could make it less
likely that they would continue to engage in aggressive behav-
ior. Thus, one perspective is that increasing victim empathy
decreases self-serving cognitive distortions (e.g., putting one’s
own needs over that of others and the community), which also
may have the effect of inhibiting aggression and other antiso-
cial behavior.169
While normative development is associated with an increase
in empathy during adolescence, aggressive delinquents have
been found to have delayed or arrested development of empa-
thy.170 One study found a moderate positive relationship
between being able to recognize fearful expressions in others
and the ability to empathize with emotional experiences.171 On
the other hand, it has recently been suggested that empathy
may be understood best in relation to one’s experiences and cir-
cumstances.172 That is, whereas empathy deficits may be part of
the personality structure in a subgroup of chronic, violent ado-
lescent offenders, other juvenile offenders “may be prone, as
any one of us is, to situation-specific empathy failures. . . .”173
Peer groups and other environmental factors influence whether
and to what extent empathy may be displayed.
Although acceptance of responsibility for offending has not
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been widely studied, related concepts have been discussed. For
instance, in one classification system, several versions of accep-
tance—concessions, excuses, justifications, and refusals—are
seen as types of “accounts.”174 Concessions include the notion
of apology. Apologies can be viewed as a form of accepting
responsibility by acknowledging the violation of a social norm.
The mechanism of how this may decrease aggression or reduce
the probability of recidivism is unknown. It is possible that an
apology can express “moral inferiority,” so if the victim accepts
the apology, there is an equalizing of the status between
offender and victim.175 An obvious limitation is that an offender
may use an apology solely for self-serving reasons (e.g., to mit-
igate a sentence), in which case no genuine acceptance of
responsibility or remorse is present.176
ASSESSMENT OF REOFFENSE RISK AND RISK-RELEVANT
NEED IN JUVENILES
An important goal of juvenile assessment is to gauge a
youth’s risk, needs, and responsivity (RNR) by identifying both
risk and protective factors. Risk factors can be defined as “exter-
nal or internal influences or conditions that are associated with
or predictive of a negative outcome.”177 One commonly used
distinction involving risk factors is static versus dynamic.178
Static risk factors are largely historical and not amenable to
change through planned intervention; they include factors such
as gender, history of abuse, history of antisocial behavior, and
history of offending. Static risk factors contribute important
information for accurately gauging reoffense risk, which in turn
is relevant to the needed intensity of rehabilitation services
(with higher risk individuals needing services of greater inten-
sity).179 Dynamic risk factors (also called criminogenic needs)
can change over time and through planned intervention. Exam-
ples include substance abuse, mental health, educational level,
peer relations, family dysfunction, and use of leisure time. For
instance, if a juvenile has a poor educational history, one appro-
priate focus of rehabilitation would include improving basic
academic skills necessary for responsible living and employ-
ment (e.g., reading, basic math).
A risk/needs assessment also may address what factors may
decrease the risk of reoffending. In contrast to risk factors, such
“protective factors” are generally those “external or internal
influences or conditions that decrease the likelihood of a nega-
tive outcome or enhance the likelihood of a positive out-
come.”180 Examples of protective factors include existing proso-
cial involvement, strong social supports, and favorable motiva-
tion/attitude toward treatment. Having such protective factors
present may increase a youth’s
“responsivity” to treatment.
The “responsivity principle” in
juvenile and correctional reha-
bilitation concerns characteris-
tics that affect a youth’s poten-
tial response to rehabilitation
rather than characteristics
directly related to antisocial
behavior.181
Risk and protective factors
have been extensively studied; some have been shown to be par-
ticularly related to reoffense risk or prevention of antisocial
behavior.182 For instance, research has shown that the strongest
predictors may include a young age at first contact with the law
and young age at commitment.183 However, it is important to
note that there is no single factor that, by itself, is highly predic-
tive of reoffending. As a result, investigators have identified mul-
tiple domains that, taken together, show a reasonably strong
relationship to reoffense risk. These domains will be summa-
rized in the next paragraph. 
Major domains in which risk and protective factors are
assessed include the individual, family, academic/vocational,
peer relations, and community domains. At the individual level,
assessment of intellectual ability, personality, and substance-use
history offer potentially useful information for appraising risk.
For instance, impulsivity/risk-taking behavior, low IQ, and high
levels of negative emotionality (e.g., anger, fear) have been
shown to be associated with higher levels of delinquent behav-
ior.184 An intolerant attitude toward deviant behavior has been
shown to have a significant risk-reducing effect in higher risk
individuals.185 The family domain includes familial/parental
stability—in particular, whether there is a history of neglect or
abuse (physical, sexual, or emotional)—and also the nature and
level of parental involvement. This domain may also reveal sev-
eral protective factors, such as positive adult influences and
whether there is a close relationship with at least one support-
ive adult. In the educational domain, an assessment of achieve-
ment and commitment to school should be made. Beyond aca-
demic achievement, schooling may help youth adapt to the
environment, establish self-esteem, and verbalize conflicts
offering alternative methods to deal with disputes or angry feel-
ings. Peer relations may serve as a risk factor not only when
there are negative peer relations (e.g., friends with arrest histo-
ries, drug abuse histories, risk-taking behaviors) but also if the
youth is socially withdrawn. Social withdrawal and isolation
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may result in increased violent
behavior.186 Finally, the environ-
ment provides another domain
in which risk and protective fac-
tors may be found, namely
socioeconomic status (SES).
Low-income and high-crime
neighborhoods are risk factors
because of the potential expo-
sure to crime and violence. An
evaluation of the community
may also reveal formal or informal support systems beyond the
family.187
The evaluation of these domains and their respective risk
and protective factors is accomplished through examining
records (e.g., school records, juvenile records), the youth’s self-
report, the report of collaterals, and the results of formal test-
ing. Collaterals typically include parents but could also include
school administrators, coaches, ministers, case managers, or
other individuals that are highly familiar with the youth’s his-
tory. The major advantage of having multiple collateral inter-
views, in conjunction with the youth’s self-report, is to broaden
the picture of the youth and assess consistency of reports across
sources. Other areas can be assessed through formal testing of
intellectual abilities, academic achievement, and personality.
Once data are collected, the assessment report summarizes rel-
evant risk and protective factors and offers areas that are
amenable to treatment.  
ROLES OF EMPATHY AND ACCEPTANCE OF 
RESPONSIBILITY IN ASSESSING REOFFENSE RISK AND
RISK-RELEVANT NEEDS IN JUVENILES
Specialized risk/needs tools are commonly used to organize
risk factors and protective factors and to promote empirically
supported risk classification. These tools facilitate structured,
informed decision making that is less subject to idiosyncratic
judgment and individual biases.188 Two such instruments
include the Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inven-
tory189 and the Structured Assessment of Risk Violence in
Youth.190 The YLS/CMI is a standardized instrument that gen-
erally assists in assessing risk, needs, and responsivity in youths
to help formulate a case plan. The SAVRY is a structured risk
assessment tool for use with adolescents that helps in gauging
an adolescent’s risk for future violent behavior. Both tools spec-
ify a series of factors, based on the best available research, to be
assessed. The evaluator rates the severity of each factor, and the
overall risk and needs are determined in light of all the infor-
mation about these relevant factors. 
Risk/needs tools are effective because they identify patterns of
behavior and traits that have been present over an extended
period in an individual’s life. Regarding empathy and acceptance
of responsibility, an evaluator should consider whether an
apparent lack of empathy relates to a single instance (e.g., the
current offense) or whether the deficit is apparent more broadly.
While both are important considerations, the latter has greater
implications regarding one’s future risk for aggressive behavior
or recidivism (see discussion of empirical literature that fol-
lows). In addition, many domains on specialized measures such
as the SAVRY are independent of the circumstances of the instant
offense. This means that much risk-relevant information can be
gathered—and rehabilitative interventions implemented—even
when acknowledgment or acceptance of responsibility in the
instant offense is not made. In a related vein, the presence of a
single risk factor (e.g., lack of empathy on the SAVRY) in the
absence of others would most often lead to the conclusion that
the individual was at low risk for future offending. 
The presence of empathy or acceptance of responsibly would
affect a number of items on the YLS/CMI in the
Personality/Behavior and Attitudes/Orientation domains. In
particular, “Inadequate Guilt Feelings” in the
Personality/Behavior domain is defined as feeling no remorse
when behavior has caused harm to another, not accepting
responsibility for actions, and offering excuses.191 In the Atti-
tudes/Orientation Domain, the “Callous, Little Concern for
Others” item is closest to “empathy”; the assessor would con-
sider evidence of little concern for the feelings or welfare of oth-
ers. Other items in this domain may also be affected by empa-
thy and acceptance of responsibility. These include “Antiso-
cial/Procriminal Attitudes,” in which the values, beliefs, and
rationalizations concerning the crime and victim are taken into
account. The items “Not Seeking Help” and “Actively Rejecting
Help” would be influenced by the youth’s failure to recognize
the need for help and resistance to interventions. 
In the SAVRY, empathy plays a direct role in the “Low Empa-
thy/Remorse” risk factor in the broader Individual/Clinical
domain. This is one of a total of 24 risk factors on this measure.
The manual defines empathy as “the identification, under-
standing, and sharing of another person’s thoughts, feelings,
and intentions.”192 Remorse is defined as “distress arising from
repentance for behavior that has hurt another.”193 Both empa-
thy and acceptance of responsibility would be rated by consid-
ering the broad patterns in the individual’s life. The individual’s
description of the alleged offense could serve as one element
within this broader pattern but would not offer an adequate
basis for rating either empathy or acceptance of responsibility
in the absence of broader (non-offense-related) behavior and
capacities.
Although empathy and acceptance of responsibility (as
reflected by remorse) are limited to one of 24 items on the
SAVRY, these constructs may be related to other items. For
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194. When there is a legal justification for an individual’s declining to
talk about the offense, such as that individual’s being so advised
by counsel on a pretrial or continuing appeal basis, then their
declining to discuss the offense or denying culpability should
not form the basis for a mental health professional’s conclusion
that such an individual lacks empathy or does not accept respon-
sibility. The two influences are inextricably intertwined and sim-
ply cannot be separated until there is no longer a legal strategic
justification for the individual’s declining to discuss the offense.
instance one item is “Negative Attitudes.” Here, an examiner
may look for indications of attitudes and values that condone
violence, or misperceiving the actions of others as being hostile
or aggressive. Another item in which empathy/acceptance of
responsibility may be reflected is “Poor Compliance.” A high
rating on this item may indicate that the youth does not believe
he or she is at risk and cannot appreciate the need for inter-
vention. Having a positive attitude toward intervention is also a
protective factor on the SAVRY and may indicate an acceptance
of responsibility.
Several important conclusions may be drawn regarding these
specialized (empirically supported) measures and their incor-
poration of empathy and acceptance of responsibility. First, the
measures consider multiple domains in yielding final conclu-
sions about risk and needs. These two items are included
within the overall number of items and domains but are suffi-
ciently small in number so that, by themselves, they would not
usually yield a conclusion that an individual was at high risk
even if they reflected significant deficits. Second, both empathy
and acceptance of responsibility are assessed using information
from the person’s life broadly. Their description of the offense is
one aspect from which judgments regarding these items can be
drawn. However, a more stable and accurate estimate would
draw upon information regarding the person’s functioning over
time, across situations, and with different people.194 Third,
deficits in empathy and acceptance of responsibility are often
related to other risk-relevant deficits in an individual. When
this occurs, the broader pattern of deficits becomes apparent,
the rated risk of reoffending is higher, and the risk-relevant
needs are more extensive.
CONCLUSION
The law is unsettled and inconsistent on the issue of com-
pelled self-incrimination for the purpose of assessing risk and
needs in the context of juvenile transfer. Empirical behavioral-
science evidence suggests that empathy and acceptance of
responsibility are modestly related to both risk and needs and
should be assessed as part of forensic mental health evaluations
of juveniles being considered for transfer. Taken together, how-
ever, empathy and acceptance of responsibility constitute only
part of the evidence relevant to assessing need and amenability
to intervention. Moreover, information about empathy and
acceptance of responsibility related directly to the circum-
stances and behavior involved in the alleged offense are an even
smaller piece of the puzzle, as both can be assessed as broader
capacities independent of the alleged offense. Accordingly, the
harm to the assessment’s relevance and reliability from not dis-
cussing the alleged offense appears minimal—while the preju-
dicial harm to the defendant stemming from compelled self-
incrimination in this context may be considerable.
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My comments use a developmental perspective on ado-lescents’ capacities as a way to supplement the con-clusions of three previous articles in this volume
(Tepfer, Nirider and Drizin;1 Frumkin;2 and Heilbrun et al.3)
that discuss policies to protect juveniles in legal contexts in
which they are asked to make self-incriminating statements.
The Tepfer and Frumkin articles provide ample reason for
concern about adolescents’ responses to police interrogation.
They argue adolescents are at greater risk of making false con-
fessions (as they are more susceptible to police interrogation
strategies) and are more likely to waive their rights due to poor
understanding or acquiescence. Tepfer and his coauthors point
out that we have entered an era of juvenile justice reform that
recognizes that “adolescents are different,” a perspective that
has received special emphasis by the U.S. Supreme Court in
several recent cases.4 Age, the Court says, must be taken into
consideration when weighing the validity of a confession.5
Frumkin describes some of the things that mental health
examiners can do to assist courts in weighing youths’ capaci-
ties and vulnerability—especially their suggestibility—in indi-
vidual cases that challenge confessions. Both articles refer
broadly to differences between adolescents and adults. My
comments add some complexities that arise when we go
beyond these differences to address diversity among young
people across the adolescent age span. This leads me to suggest
some refinements in our thinking about the types of protec-
tions needed for juveniles in police interrogations. 
In a very different legal context, Heilbrun and his coauthors
focus on practice in many states that allows pretrial transfer
evaluations to include examiners’ discussions with juveniles
about their involvement in their alleged offenses. The pre-
sumed value of talking about the alleged offense is to deter-
mine whether the youth has empathy or remorse, which is rel-
evant for judging whether the young person can be rehabili-
tated or, if not, should be tried and potentially sentenced as an
adult. This may seem like an entirely different context than
police interrogation. Yet when viewed from a developmental
perspective, as I will do later, we encounter some of the same
concerns about youths’ capacities that arise in discussions of
their behaviors in police interrogations. And here too a devel-
opmental perspective leads us to some considerations that
seem not to have been recognized by courts when shaping law
and policy for juvenile transfer proceedings. 
ADOLESCENTS’ FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Adolescents are different from adults because they are still
undergoing development in several areas that influence com-
prehension and decision making. The evidence comes from
neuroscience regarding adolescent brain development as well
as from behavioral studies of adolescents’ functioning on tasks
that demonstrate comprehension and decision making. The
evidence can be summarized as follows.6
In general, several abilities continue to develop and improve
throughout adolescence that might make a difference in teens’
capacities in legal contexts. These include: (a) basic knowledge
of the world, including the risks associated with various deci-
sions; (b) the ability to handle abstract concepts (like the
meaning of a “right”); (c) the ability to delay impulses by stop-
ping to think about consequences before deciding (for exam-
ple, about whether to admit or deny involvement in an alleged
offense); (d) using judgment that weighs long-term positive or
negative consequences, not just short-term gains; and (e) a
developing sense of independent autonomy and identity asso-
ciated with making decisions that are not merely acquiescent
or oppositional responses to peers or authority figures. Read-
ers of the Tepfer and Frumkin articles will see the relation
between these developing abilities and our concerns about
adolescents’ capacities to make voluntary, knowing, and intel-
ligent decisions about their rights and their responses to police
questioning. 
Recognizing that “adolescents are different from adults” in
these ways is essential when fashioning special protections for
juveniles in police interrogations. But that distinction only
takes us partway to our objective, because it focuses on ado-
lescent–adult differences and does not consider differences
among adolescents. 
Variability among adolescents in their capacities can be
framed in two ways. First, younger adolescents are far less
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capable than older ones. Improvements in ability are continu-
ous across the six years between the 12th birthday and the
18th birthday. The risks of vulnerability due to lesser capaci-
ties are greater in the younger teen years than for the “average”
adolescent and far greater than for older adolescents.7 (We rec-
ognize this when we allow older but not younger adolescents
to obtain a driver’s license.) It is true that various fMRI studies
of adolescent brain development find that changes in areas of
the brain relevant for decision making continue well into the
20s.8 In this sense, even older adolescents have not achieved
the neurodevelopmental status of adults. Yet on tasks involv-
ing Miranda comprehension and abilities related to compe-
tence to stand trial, research typically finds little average dif-
ference in performance between 16–17 year olds and young
adults.9 The same studies find much difference between early
teens and these age groups. Thus, there is great variability in
capacities across the adolescent years  because of substantial
differences on average between younger and older adolescents.
Second, variability in the capacities of adolescents that
make them generally less mature than adults is seen not only
between younger and older adolescents, but also within any
specific age. Most forensic mental health professionals who
evaluate juveniles can provide examples of some 14-year-olds
whose understanding of Miranda warnings or ability to make
reasonable decisions under stress surpassed those of some
adults, as well as examples of 18-year-olds who were more vul-
nerable than the average 14-year-old. Courts are right to
require attention to age when weighing young people’s capaci-
ties, because on average these change with each advancing year
until they stabilize in adulthood. Yet a youth’s age itself is an
imperfect factor for making assumptions about an individual,
because any specific age group includes young people with
capacities ranging from far below to far above the average.
In summary, “adolescence” as a period of development from
about ages 12 through 17 is a meaningful class for many pur-
poses when thinking about needed protections in police inter-
rogation. Yet the needs and capacities of most 12-year-olds are
quite different from those of most 17-year-olds, thus making
“juvenile” or “adolescent” a less-than-meaningful class for
some purposes. These simple developmental observations are
at the heart of challenges to our efforts to fashion protective
policies for juvenile interrogations. I will return to those chal-
lenges in a moment.
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
The Tepfer and Frumkin analyses explore complexities in
identifying youths’ capacities. Those complexities are even
greater, however, if one considers the mental disorders
among young people who are arrested and questioned by law
enforcement officers. A significant body of research10 sup-
ports the conclusion that at least
60% of youth who are arrested
and enter juvenile detention cen-
ters meet standard psychiatric
diagnostic criteria for one or
more mental disorders.  About
40% have more than one disor-
der, and about 20% have serious,
persistent, and chronic mental
disorders. Symptoms of disorders
found among delinquent youths
often include clinically signifi-
cant anxiety (sometimes related
to trauma), depression (related
to affective disorders), and
impulsiveness (especially related to ADHD).  As a conse-
quence, many young people who are questioned by law
enforcement officers are burdened not only by immature
capacities related to their level of development, but also by
symptoms of mental disorders. 
Symptoms of mental disorder have two general effects that
are relevant to consider in the context of young persons’ vul-
nerability during police questioning. First, most of these symp-
toms increase a youth’s susceptibility to interrogation strate-
gies and decrease the ability to use the already-immature
capacities that the youth might have. Second, persistent men-
tal disorder can cause delays in an adolescent’s general devel-
opment, such that the youth lags behind his or her peers both
cognitively and socially. This is another reason that age norms
for adolescent functioning are only a starting point for consid-
ering the capacities of individual young people. 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL DIVERSITY FOR
LAW AND POLICY IN POLICE INTERROGATIONS
The diversity of abilities among younger and older adoles-
cents—and within any specific age group—is important to
consider when we analyze our laws and policies for protecting
juveniles’ rights in police interrogations. Our mechanisms for
protection are at two levels: (a) guiding and restricting police
interrogations at the time that confessions are obtained, and
(b) judicial adjudication of cases in which claims are made that
waivers and confessions obtained in police interrogation were
invalid. The diversity of abilities among adolescents across or
within various ages is addressed by the modes of protection
provided in the latter context, but not the former. 
Regarding the latter, courts’ scrutiny of the validity of con-
fessions or waiver of rights is guided by a “totality of circum-
stances” test.11 This presumes that no specific characteristic of
the child and no specific interrogation behavior of law enforce-
ment officers are determinative of the validity of waiver or the
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voluntariness of a youth’s con-
fession. For example, the
younger the juvenile, the more
carefully the matter of suscepti-
bility to coercion may be scruti-
nized.  But the mere fact that
the youth is 13 or 14 is neither
dispositive nor even presump-
tive regarding an answer to the
legal question. Every case must
be weighed according to the
balance of factors in the specific
case. This approach provides for individual consideration of
the wide range of developmental and psychiatric statuses of
adolescents. As Frumkin describes, many of these characteris-
tics can be assessed by mental health professionals who can
provide such information to the court when waivers and con-
fessions are questioned. 
But regarding the first type of protective intervention, poli-
cies to guide police questioning, a “totality of circumstances”
approach is of questionable value. There are three reasons.
First, police are provided operating procedures to apply to
adolescents in general. There are exceptions in some jurisdic-
tions; for example, some require parents’ presence when sus-
pects are 14 or younger.  But by and large police are not pro-
vided separate procedures for younger and older adolescents. 
Second, judicial “totality of circumstances” opinions do not
provide meaningful guidance for police officers regarding how
to manage interrogations with adolescents of different ages. We
sometimes presume that juvenile court decisions about the
validity of youths’ confessions or waiver of rights will some-
how “set precedent” that will be translated into better police
practices. Yet there is relatively little for police to learn from
judicial decisions in this arena. When each case is decided on
the “totality of circumstances,” no single factor is likely to be
highlighted in a manner that “sends a message” to police about
how to adjust their practices. For example, a 13-year-old’s vul-
nerability may weigh heavily in the court’s decision in one case
and be offset by other factors in another case. The multiplicity
of factors weighed in those cases creates no clear guidance
about how police officers are to translate any of the factors into
judgments about their handling of juvenile cases.
Third, even if it were clear that certain developmental or
pathological characteristics of adolescents create greater risk of
invalid waivers, this offers law enforcement officers little assis-
tance. The circumstances of police investigations do not allow
for individual assessments, and law enforcement officers
should not be expected to “assess” youths’ developmental
capacities and mental disorders before questioning them. Such
a requirement would hold law enforcement officers account-
able for employing discretion that they cannot be expected to
exercise meaningfully. 
Tepfer and Frumkin offer one approach to this problem.
They refer to the value of judicial use of the best-practices
guidelines for juvenile interrogations developed by the Inter-
national Association of Chiefs of Police.12 If used consistently
by judges, the guidelines might clarify some factors for police.
But will guidelines such as those offered by the IACP be ade-
quate to deal with the diversity of capacities across the adoles-
cent age spectrum? For example, will “limiting juvenile ques-
tioning sessions to an hour” have the same ameliorative effect
for the average 12-year-old as for a 16-year-old? Will non-lead-
ing and dispassionate interviewing do anything at all to
address younger adolescents’ vulnerability to making state-
ments based primarily on their desire to escape the immediate
situation rather than considering longer-range consequences
of their choices?13 Will the simplified Miranda warning, “You
have the right to get help from a lawyer right now,” and the
youth’s reply, “It means I can get a lawyer right now if I want,”
have any protective value for the majority of 13-year-olds, if
they do not know the types of help a lawyer might provide?14
For purposes of fashioning protective police practices in the
interrogation of adolescents, developmental considerations do
not support the notion that “one size fits all.” There is suffi-
cient research on the behavioral, cognitive, and functional dif-
ferences between youth 14 and under and older juveniles to
require protections for younger adolescents that go beyond
those that law and policy for police interrogations might fash-
ion for juveniles as a class.  When I performed the first studies
of juveniles’ capacities to understand and waive Miranda
rights, I concluded that juveniles 14 and younger were espe-
cially poorly equipped to understand Miranda rights and to
make decisions to waive them.15 Since that time (30 years ago),
much more research has examined youths’ capacities related to
Miranda waivers and confessions16 and to abilities relevant for
competence to stand trial.17 Most of those studies have found
results consistent with my suggestion that while juveniles as a
class need special protections during interrogation, the
youngest adolescents need even more. The same project pro-
vided evidence that merely requiring the presence of parents
offered little meaningful protection. My suggestion at the
time—I was young and exuberant—was a legal requirement
that interrogation of adolescents 14 and younger should not
occur without the presence of legal counsel. 
My point is not to argue for this specific protection, but to
supplement the two preceding articles by arguing the need for
a tiered perspective when fashioning policies for police prac-
tices in juvenile interrogations. Protections based on an “aver-
age” for adolescents may be insufficient for the youngest ado-
lescents, most of whom are developmentally immature even in
relation to the average for young people seen in juvenile courts. 
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18. Donald Lynam et al., Longitudinal Evidence That Psychopathy
Scores in Early Adolescence Predict Adult Psychopathy, 116 J.
ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 155 (2007).
19. My description is based primarily on experience, not on research.
Transfer evaluations by mental health professionals are one of the
least-researched types of forensic mental health assessment.  The
little that has been published in this area has been reviewed in
Thomas Grisso, Clinicians’ Transfer Evaluations: How Well Can
They Assist Judicial Discretion? 71 LA. L. REV. 157–89 (2010).
20. In many states, juveniles have the right to have their attorneys
present during forensic evaluations.  In my experience, attorneys
rarely choose to be present.  
IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL IMMATURITY FOR
TRANSFER EVALUATIONS
Heilbrun and his coauthors reviewed laws and policies
allowing or prohibiting inquiry about the alleged offense when
mental health professionals examine a juvenile for a transfer
hearing. The authors explain that courts believe discussion of
the offense is important to learn whether the juvenile in ques-
tion experiences remorse and acceptance of responsibility, sug-
gesting better prospects for treatment in the juvenile system.
They  review research on the relation of empathy and future
offending, finding some limited evidence for it. This analysis is
certainly helpful, but a developmental perspective offers addi-
tional questions.
First, as the authors of the Heilbrun article explain, affective
and cognitive empathy appear to have some relation to offend-
ing among juveniles, and the relation is a bit stronger in juve-
niles than in adults. They also explain that empathy involves
the ability to understand (cognitive) or feel (affective) the con-
dition of the other person.  Many of the studies they cite use
methods that assess whether the person can recognize others’
emotions. Yet if we are interested in whether empathy serves to
reduce offending, we must know whether a person can recog-
nize others’ emotions before those emotions are displayed—
indeed, often at times before an offense when the potential vic-
tim is not yet present. “How would a hypothetical person feel
if, hypothetically, I were to do something to them?” This
“empathy in advance” requires more than recognizing and feel-
ing another person’s emotions. It requires some level of ability
to think abstractly about people and feelings that do not yet
exist. Developmental psychology tells us that reasoning about
abstractions is one of the capacities that is developing early in
adolescence. Typically it has formed by ages 12 or 13, but for
many youth with developmental delays (due to intellectual
disability, mental disorders, or economic disadvantage), it may
still be developing well into mid-adolescence. 
If the capacity for this type of “empathy in advance” is
changing (increasing) across some part of adolescence, then
what we learn about an adolescent’s empathy at a given point
in time may simply be the youth’s current level of development
regarding empathic responsiveness, not an indication of the
youth’s capacity for it in the future. We have some evidence of
the implications of this. The Heilbrun article points out that
lack of empathy has been related to measures of “callous-
unemotional trait,” which is one component of psychopathy.
Yet a well-constructed longitudinal research study recently
found that if we use a high score on a measure of such charac-
teristics at age 14 to predict that the youth’s score will be high
ten years later, we will be right only 16% of the time.18 Callous-
unemotional trait and capacities for empathy may be more
developmentally stable when measured in older adolescents.
But in states that allow 13- and
14-year-olds to face transfer
hearings, assessing their empathy
at that age tells us their current
empathic functioning at best, but
may tell us little about their
future capacity for empathy.
Second, judging from Heil-
brun’s description of court deci-
sions on this issue, few if any
courts have been thinking about
transfer evaluations as events to
which adolescents respond
according to their developmental
characteristics. They are focusing
on protecting defendants from self-incrimination in future
legal proceedings. But in the language of validity of waivers in
police interrogations, they are not thinking about the “totality
of circumstances.” Given youths’ relative immaturity—and
given the procedures employed by forensic examiners—what
are the possible threats to the reliability of the information that
will be obtained for the transfer hearing? Even with adequate
protections against the use of self-incriminating statements in
future adjudication of the offense, what are the implications
for the quality of information for purposes of the transfer hear-
ing itself? 
To examine these implications, we must talk about the con-
text.19 There are some similarities between the transfer evalua-
tion and the police interrogation. In both contexts, an author-
ity figure meets with a subject in a setting in which the subject
is not free to leave (or is likely to perceive the situation in that
way). The authority figure and the subject are alone; there is no
legal counsel present.20 The authority figure gives the subject a
warning that the information can be used for some future legal
purpose. Both contexts typically involve some type of “conver-
sation” about the subject’s life circumstances (school, home,
etc.) before discussing the offense, often designed in part to cre-
ate a condition in which the subject will talk freely. Eventually
the topic of the alleged offense is raised, and the authority fig-
ure asks the subject to talk about it. With some variability, the
authority figures in both contexts may display a manner that
suggests to the subject that the reason for talking about the
alleged offense is in part to advance the subject’s own welfare. 
There are also some differences between the two contexts.
Unlike the interrogation context, the juvenile is likely to have
been advised by legal counsel before the transfer evaluation.
The content of the warning in the transfer evaluation will dif-
fer from the Miranda warnings of police interrogations: for
example, that the evaluation will be used by the court to deter-
mine whether the youth will remain in juvenile court or be
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transferred to be tried as an adult; that if transferred, and if
found guilty, the youth will be subject to penalties like an
adult; that what the youth says now will not be used in that
future trial, only in the transfer hearing. In contrast to the
police interrogator, the forensic examiner will ask many more
questions about the juvenile’s general life and background to
meet the clinical purposes of the evaluation, as well as probing
much more about the juvenile’s motivations for the offense and
subsequent feelings about it.
At some point, the forensic examiner will pose the question:
“I’d like to talk to you about what happened that night in the
alley. Are you willing to do that?” And later, “How did you feel
afterwards?”  Now the youth has to make some choices, many
of which are similar to those made in police interrogations:
whether to admit or deny or partially admit or deny and, in any
case, how to manage the questioning that will follow. And now
we encounter the same questions about the potential influence
of developmental immaturity on the youth’s decisions. Believ-
ing that authority figures like forensic examiners will help
them only if they confess, will they confess to things they did
not do? Fearing punishment, will they minimize their involve-
ment in the offense in ways that are clearly contradictory to
known facts, thus causing them to appear to be avoiding
responsibility? Seeking peer approval, will they put on a
remorseless face to impress their cohorts who are similarly
charged? Being traumatized by the offense itself, will they react
as many younger adolescents do by burying their emotions so
as not to be overwhelmed by them, leading to a flat appearance
that we can easily misinterpret as a sign of lack of remorse? 
There is no research to tell us whether or how frequently
young people engage in such behaviors in transfer evaluations.
But as a forensic examiner who used to do many transfer eval-
uations, I have seen all of these reactions and had to contend
with their meaning. Over time I learned to distrust the transfer
evaluation interview as a place to learn about young people’s
degree of remorse—just as we distrust juveniles’ confessions in
police interrogations. Observing a young person’s sadness and
apologies, or lack of them, in the complex social context of a
transfer evaluation usually told me little that I could rely on.
Much better were data obtained from situations outside the
interview: for example, in the case of one youth, the docu-
mented fact that while he was fleeing from the alley where he
had just stabbed another boy in a fight, he stopped at some-
one’s house to alert 911 to the injured boy’s whereabouts before
going into hiding. Any competent forensic examiner will look
outside the interview for data to arrive at meaningful infer-
ences about remorse and empathy.
Heilbrun and his coauthors concluded that empathy related
to the offense was only a “smaller piece of the puzzle” for
determining amenability to rehabilitation, so that allowing
inquiry about the offense during transfer evaluations is not of
great value.  Similarly, my analysis suggests that courts may be
overestimating the importance of allowing inquiry about the
offense in transfer evaluations. My reasoning, however, adds to
the problem the risk of the unreliability of information gained
in that context, given the influence of developmental immatu-
rity on juveniles’ responses to the transfer evaluation inquiry. 
CONCLUSION
This brief commentary on the three preceding articles rein-
forces the value of “thinking developmentally” about adoles-
cents’ responses to police interrogations and legally relevant
clinical interviews. For police interrogations, it suggests that
our future thoughts about policy and law regarding special
protections for juveniles may need to go beyond “adoles-
cent–adult differences” to consider special protections related
to differences among adolescents themselves—younger and
older, average and disabled. For transfer evaluations, our
thinking about policy regarding inquiries into the offense to
determine remorse and empathy may need to go beyond the
question of protections against self-incrimination. We should
consider the ways in which juveniles’ developmental immatu-
rity may seriously limit the reliability of what we can learn in
the context of our inquiry.
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NEW PUBLICATIONS
Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System and American
College of Trial Lawyers, Working
Smarter, Not Harder: How Excellent
Judges Manage Cases (2014) (39 pp.)
http://goo.gl/MgS573 
How often do you have the chance to
get tips from judges throughout the
country who have been recognized for
their ability to fairly and efficiently han-
dle civil cases? Even at the AJA’s annual
educational conference, which had a pro-
gram on this topic in 2013, you would
hear only from a few judges. But the
American College of Trial Lawyers and
the Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System have teamed up
on a project that brings you the tips of
nearly 30 such judges.
American College of Trial Lawyers
members identified judges in seven states,
representing population and geographic
diversity, who were outstanding civil-case
managers. They then interviewed those
judges on a series of structured topics
about case management, including how
to handle discovery generally, discovery
disputes, dispositive motions, settlement
possibilities, sanctions, trial settings, and
other matters. This highly readable, 39-
page report summarizes the suggestions.
As the report explains, five general
themes emerged:
• Assess a case and its challenges at the
outset. Use active and continuing judi-
cial involvement when warranted to
keep the parties and the case on track.
• Convene an initial case management
conference early in the life of the case.
Discuss with the parties anticipated
problems and issues, as well as dead-
lines for major case events.
• Reduce and streamline motions prac-
tice to the extent appropriate and pos-
sible. Rule quickly on motions.
• Create a culture of collegiality and
professionalism by being explicit and
up front with the lawyers about the
court’s expectations, and then holding
the participants to them.
• Explore settlement with the parties at
an early stage and periodically
throughout the pretrial process, where
such conversations might benefit the
parties and move the case toward reso-
lution.
The full report provides suggestions
related to each of these themes and
includes sample provisions from discov-
ery and scheduling orders. 
A Community Court Grows in 
Brooklyn: A Comprehensive 
Evaluation of the Red Hook 
Community Justice Center
http://goo.gl/ODNyDB (Full Report)
http://goo.gl/QdKYee (Exec. Summary)
The first community court in the
United States was established in 1993 in
a midtown Manhattan neighborhood of
New York City. A few years later, in 2000,
the Red Hook Community Justice Center
in nearby Brooklyn began operation.
Today, there are at least 70 in operation
around the world. 
A new report provides the first com-
prehensive, independent evaluation of
the Red Hook Community Justice Center.
The study was conducted by the National
Center for State Courts in partnership
with the Center for Court Innovation and
the John Jay College of Criminal Justice.
The report is comprehensive, evaluat-
ing differences between the community-
court model and traditional court in areas
including sanctions, recidivism, arrest
rates, and costs. The report concluded
that community courts can reduce crime
and strengthen neighborhoods. Of partic-
ular interest are findings suggesting that
the procedural-fairness principles applied
in the Red Hook Community Justice
Center have led to a greater perception by
the community of the court’s legitimacy,
and that this greater legitimacy has led to
better outcomes. Study data also sug-
gested that the public’s perception that
the court shared community values had
helped its effectiveness.
Links provided above will take you
either to the full report or an executive
summary. In addition for specific com-
ments about the report’s findings on pro-
cedural fairness, see a blog posting by
one of the study’s authors, David
Rottman, at http://goo.gl/uHfyqz. 
o
WEBSITES OF INTEREST
Northwestern Law School, Bluhm
Legal Clinic, Center on Wrongful 
Convictions of Youth
http://goo.gl/29MVaP
The authors of our lead article, which
analyzes the emerging caselaw on juvenile
confessions, are part of Northwestern Law
School’s Center on Wrongful Convictions
of Youth. That center maintains a website
with resources related to this subject.
The website has a number of useful
resources, including a list of recent arti-
cles related to wrongful convictions and
court orders suppressing apparently
unreliable confessions. Also included is
an interactive map showing key develop-
ments by state in several areas, including
juvenile Miranda warnings and the 
presence of attorneys or parents during
interrogations.
The Resource Page
g
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